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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE BREECHLOADER AND CONSERVATISM, 1841-1892 
 
  The decades following the American Civil War were a time of change for the 
United States Army, as it attempted to reequip itself and readjust to peacetime after four 
years of bloody conflict. During this time, the nations of Europe, inspired by Prussia’s 
success with its famous Dreyse Zundnadelgewehr or “needle-gun,” the world’s first 
standard issue breech-loading infantry rifle, in the Second Schleswig War of 1864, also 
struggled to retool their militaries. David A. Armstrong, in Bullets and Bureaucrats: The 
Machine Gun and the United States Army, 1861-1916, attributes what he labels as 
conservatism in the United States Army to budgetary restrictions imposed by Congress. 
Certainly, lack of funds inhibited the army’s progress and restricted its ability to test and 
procure new weapons, but the army itself attempted to do just that. Rather than create 
requirements based primarily on economics, the army always was concerned about 
battlefield reliability and ease of manufacture, as well as giving its numerically weak 
force the greatest amount of firepower. Armstrong argues that the army’s money woes 
made the Ordnance Department “conservative” and “cost-conscious,” but also notes that 
the army ordered one hundred experimental Gatling guns at a time when “No major 
European power had yet evinced more than a passing interest in machine guns, ” 
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demonstrating that ordnance officers were concerned with equipping the army with 
modern weaponry.1 The United States Army when viewed as a contemporary of 
European powers from 1865-1884 was not conservative, as it examined rifles, machine-
guns, and new types of artillery for the entire time period, and attempted to create new 
tactical doctrines to employ them. In addition, the army paid close attention to the wars 
fought in Europe and the ideas created by other powers. Congress hampered its ability to 
rearm and conduct extensive testing, but in reality, the army was on par with Britain, 
Prussia/Germany, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy. It only lagged behind in magazine 
rifles at a time when many of the European powers adopted ad hoc, temporary designs. 
  As nations tested new equipment, their generals reflected on the experience in the 
military conflicts of the era, namely the Schleswig War, American Civil War, Austro-
Prussian War, Franco-Prussian War, and Russo-Turkish War, in an attempt to adopt the 
best equipment available. Due to its failure to adopt a magazine rifle before 1892, its 
inability to create a workable doctrine embracing the machine-gun, and its usage of a 
single style of breech-loading rifle for almost thirty years many historians describe the 
United States Army during this time as a conservative military power. It spent 
comparatively little, settled on a breechloader converted from a musket and fabricated 
new examples of the “trapdoor” Springfield as its primary infantry rifle. Meanwhile, the 
Ordnance Department refused to adopt new magazine weapons – all the while having 
access to civilian-issue patterns or designs used during the Civil War.   
  Historians have generally concentrated their scholarship on the American Army in 
the period 1865-1892 on the three main conflicts fought during this time.  The first 
                                                          
1
 David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the United States Army, 1861-1916 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 46. 
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examines the United States Army as a constabulary force fighting Indians on the frontier. 
The second examines the aspect of the imperialistic wars fought in Cuba and the 
Philippines at the dawn of the twentieth century.  Finally, new works examine the 
preparedness of the army in both of these conflicts in comparison with its performance in 
the Punitive Expedition and the First World War. Collectively, these works, while 
insightful and generally authoritative on the specialized subjects they cover, fail to 
compare the supposed “conservatism” of the United States Army to that of other military 
powers during the era. The United States used breech-loading and magazine rifles in 
combat, although not as standard issue, before most European powers adopted such 
weapons. The army procured and deployed workable machine-guns well before European 
nations.  
  When examined as a contemporary of Europe, the evidence demonstrates that 
while the breechloader was the preferred weapon for a continental-style army, between 
the years 1864 and 1884, the American Army was not conservative and remained on a 
competitive plane, at least technologically, with the armies of Europe. After the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-1878 gave an impetus to militaries to rearm with magazine guns 
and after Europe began to do so in 1884, the American Army adopted a conservative 
stance and sought to cling to an outdated weapon. The United States Army’s Ordnance 
Department understood the revolutionary nature of the breech-loading rifle and carbine 
and despite indecisiveness in choosing a rifle system fabricated thousands of test 
examples to train and equip the army with a new weapon. Due to a lack of doctrine and 
worldwide slowness in immediately rearming with the new weapons, the department 
failed to realize the changed nature of warfare the necessity to rearm with a weapon that 
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took advantage of the new capabilities of a fast-firing repeater. 
  Conservatism, as defined in this work, is a term that denotes a reluctance to adopt 
or implement technologies or doctrines already proven and adopted by major military 
powers. While the traditional definition of the word usually involves a preoccupation 
with economic interests, cost consciousness, as explained by David Armstong, is not 
synonymous with conservatism. The United States Army in the decades after the Civil 
War had a limited budget. Even with severely reduced funds, it nevertheless sought to 
develop and adopt a rifle that was the equal of those used in Europe. It requisitioned 
funds to procure and test service rifles against those used in foreign armies. Even before 
Europe gave thought to their adoption, the cash-strapped American Army purchased 
machine-guns and began testing them. After adopting the .45-caliber Springfield rifle in 
1873, the army continually tried to improve it, while testing magazine rifles.  
 The army’s continued reliance on items produced during the Civil War does not 
constitute conservatism. Robert M. Utley in Frontier Regulars: The United States Army 
and the Indian, 1866-1891, advances such an argument, in part, because it took fifteen 
years to sell off or use the items, and because new adoptions generally started out as 
improvements of Civil-War era equipment.2 The War Department sold off many of the 
goods, and sought only to make the best use of what was already available. Using 
equipment and not wasting it is not conservatism. The army had a large number of 
muskets left in arsenals after the war and it was not until the 1870s before the government 
                                                          
2
 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 69. 
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disposed of all of the rifle muskets.3 The army needed to make use of these muskets to 
gain a breech-loading rifle quickly. The army initially wanted to have a system to convert 
muzzle-loading muskets into breechloaders, but by 1868, five years before the army 
made its final decision on a weapons system, the breech-loading rifles fabricated at 
Springfield Armory, while based on conversions, featured new-made barrels, breeches, 
and stocks, indicating that the army no longer required a conversion of older weapons.4 
Thus, the argument that because the United States adopted the “trapdoor” rifle designed 
by Erskine S. Allin to convert most of the old muskets, and save money, is incorrect, as 
only about 57,000 muskets were so converted at a time when the Ordnance Department 
sold off 1,340,000 muskets of all types.5 While many stocks of Civil War-era gear, as 
Utley notes, took time to issue, this fact is not necessarily an indicator of conservatism. 
An army may adopt new types of haversacks or canteens, but they do the same job as 
older patterns, only marginally better. Certainly new patterns could be adopted, but in a 
cash-strapped post-war army, the nation and the soldiers were better served by that 
money going into new arms, machine-guns, artillery, and other improvements, as 
opposed to adopting new items of secondary importance. 
  Historian Earl J. Hess in The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth 
is quite harsh in his assessment of the post-war army. He argues that the army became 
conservative, and fell behind European powers during the international arms race 
                                                          
3
 United States War Department, Ordnance Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance to the 
Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1870 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1870), 8.  
4
 Richard A. Hosmer, The .58- and .50-caliber Rifles and Carbines of the Springfield Armory, 1865-1872 
(Tustin, CA: North Cape Publications, 2006), 54. 
5
 Hosmer, The .58- and .50-Caliber Rifles and Carbines of the Springfield Armory, 1865-1872, 6, 27; 
Ordnance Department, Report of the Chief of Ordnance 1870, 8. 
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following the Danish War and the American Civil War.6 True, the army did fall behind 
with the adoption of magazine rifles and smokeless weapons during the 1880s and 1890s; 
that argument is not in dispute. The army did not fall behind during the era of the 
breechloader, as ordnance officials regularly tested the Springfield against its European 
competitors. During the period of the breechloader, the Springfield served adequately and 
was not inferior to the weapons then in use in Europe. While some of the rifle designs in 
use in Europe, specifically the Mauser and the Beaumont, utilized bolt actions similar to 
what would endure well after the period, armies discarded those rifles about the same 
time as the United States did the Springfield. 
  Chapter Two, “Zundnadelgewehr and Mitrailleuse: Europe in the Breechloader 
Era, 1841-1877,” examines the armies of Britain, France, Prussia, Italy, Austria, 
Switzerland, and Russia and their attempts to incorporate machine-guns, breechloaders, 
and magazine weapons in their armies between the adoption of the Prussian 
Zundnadelgewehr  or needle-gun in 1841 and the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War in 
1877. Some, like Austria or Italy, acted slower than the United States, others about as 
quickly, while Switzerland in 1869 became the first power to adopt as standard issue a 
magazine rifle, the Vetterli. This section examines the role of the needle-gun, its combat 
performance in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, and its impact on 
breechloader development. The work also examines French machine-guns or 
mitrailleuses in combat and how they failed to cause a significant shift in military tactics. 
Against this backdrop, the actions of the United States may seem indecisive or slow, but 
certainly not conservative. 
                                                          
6
 Earl J. Hess, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2008), 218. 
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  Chapter Three, “’Better Than the Much-Vaunted Prussian Needle-Gun’: The 
American Army’s Search For a Rifle, 1864-1869” analyzes the United States Army and 
its attempts to standardize on a rifle from 1864 when the United States Patent Office 
demanded a breechloader through Springfield Armory’s production of a rifle that was no 
longer a conversion of a rifle musket. This section explores the army’s use of a breech-
loading rifle during the Civil War, its goals in the immediate post-war period, and the 
steps that General Alexander B. Dyer took to help refine the rifle designed by master 
armorer Erskine S. Allin of Springfield Armory. This chapter details the 1866 Hancock 
Arms Board, the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867, and the effects of the Austro-
Prussian War on American policy. The focus on this chapter will be the army’s attempts 
to evaluate, test, and equip itself with a breechloader, without merely accepting what the 
national armory produced and rejecting weapons that did not meet the needs of its 
infantry and cavalry. 
  Chapter Four, “The Icon of Conservatism: The Adoption of the Model 1873 
Springfield, 1869-1875” examines the effects of the arms boards of 1870 and 1872-1873, 
and the events leading up to the adoption of a reduced cartridge, a new rifle, and the 
effects of the Franco-Prussian War on American military policy. Against these European 
events, improvements continued within the army, as the army was unwilling to use the 
exact same pattern of weapon without improvement. While the United States Army 
standardized on the rifle produced at the national armory, events later demonstrated that 
the design was sound and competitive with European weapons. These tests pitted the rifle 
systems long favored by army officers since the Civil War against those used in Europe 
at the time. While not all American systems fared as well as others, the United States 
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Army had specific complaints of defects with European arms, which, as opposed to 
conservatism, demonstrated forward thinking as within five years of the 1870 board most 
of the European nations replaced the patterns of arms they were using. This chapter also 
demonstrates that the commanding generals saw the American Army as a traditional 
European style force and events in the Franco-Prussian War showed that they were keen 
to see how their troops, guns, and equipment would perform in a traditional battle and 
against a European army.  
  Chapter Five, “As Effective as Forty Springfields: Machine-Guns and Magazine 
Rifles, 1865-1878” examines the development of machine-guns and the testing of 
magazine-fed weapons in the United States Army from the adoption of the first Gatling 
Guns in 1865 to the close of the Russo-Turkish War of 1878. While the United States 
Army, like Europe, did not understand how to employ the weapons effectively, the fact 
remains that the supposedly conservative Americans adopted these new weapons before 
their European counterparts. This chapter also discusses the problems of ammunition 
supply, which figured prominently in European resistance to machine-gun technology 
during the 1870s. 
  Chapter Six, “’Considered a More Serviceable Gun’: The Springfield and 
European Arms, 1875-1885” investigates comparisons of the .45-caliber Springfield with 
European arms, American improvements to the rifle, and the performance of European 
weapons from the general issue of the Springfield in 1875 to the British battle of Abu 
Klea in the Sudan in 1885. The Springfield, despite having an older-looking design, was 
just as good as the British Martini-Henry, and according to at least one British observer 
was better than the European rifle because it was simple and of stronger construction. In 
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the comparison between the Springfield and the Martini-Henry, evidence reveals that 
faulty ammunition was to blame for most of the weapons’ deficiencies. The chapter also 
deals with the attempts by the American Army to create a Springfield with a permanently 
attached integral bayonet, which met mostly with failure but the Ordnance Department 
produced it anyway, signaling the beginning of a conservative trend and a refusal to 
abandon poor concepts. 
  Chapter Seven, “Conclusion:  End of an Era and the Beginning of Conservatism, 
1885-1892” examines the army’s transformation towards a conservative power from the 
period following the general adoption of magazine rifles in Europe, beginning with the 
German 1871/84 Mauser in 1884, until the United States’s adoption of a magazine rifle in 
1892. The army loved its Springfield, and the new Chief of Ordnance, General Stephen 
V. Benét, did not want to expend a large amount of resources on new types of rifles, and 
these sentiments caused the army to be slow in adopting new technologies after European 
armies had done so in the 1880s.  As these weapons did not have a rate of fire 
significantly higher than the breechloader, many in the American Army wanted to create 
a smokeless version of the venerable rifle. Finally, the army designed the smokeless 
magazine rifle finally adopted in 1892 so carefully around army doctrine of the 1870s and 
1880s that it, in effect, was no more than a single-loader with a magazine. This section 
endeavors to understand why the army that had demonstrated such foresight and a lack of 
conservatism for twenty-eight years regarding new rifles was unable to grasp the new 
improvements of the late 1880s. 
 The genesis of this project lay in the reading of Isabel V. Hull’s Absolute 
Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, and it is 
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perhaps ironic that a study of the United States Army and its attempt to acquire an 
effective rifle began with a book about European military history. In discussing how 
European armies shared more similarities than differences, Hull noticed that they studied 
each other, observed each other’s wars, and officers published in foreign military journals 
and that officers in one army read another force’s work.7 Similarly, although not 
mentioned in her work, European armies also expressed interest, to varying degrees, in 
the United States Army, and sent observers to report on the American Civil War. If 
Europe expressed interest in the United States, and examination of militaries was a 
common practice, then it only makes sense that the United States, during the period of 
rapid modernization of the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, would do the same and 
study the developments of Europe. Following the American Civil War, the United States 
Army regularly examined military developments in Europe, especially the Austro-
Prussian, Franco-Prussian, and Russo-Turkish Wars. During this period, the army sought 
to adopt technologies that were superior to those in Europe, and abandon the previous 
notions of adopting European technologies and tactics for the sake of them being 
European. At this time, the United States Army strove to be a European-style army, while 
incorporating American-made improvements and forging its own style of fighting force. 
  The United States Army was not a conservative power at the beginning of the 
breechloader era. It embraced change, and began breech-loading testing before many 
European nations, and the weapon adopted was equal to the rifles of Europe. When under 
a new Chief of Ordnance, instead of issuing masses of prototypes for field trials, the 
Ordnance Department lagged behind and refused to adopt a magazine rifle speedily. The 
                                                          
7
 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 98-99. 
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department was not as sluggish in the pushing of a Springfield rifle with an integral 
bayonet. While the United States was conservative with magazine arms after 1884, from 
1865 until 1884 it demonstrated a lack of conservatism with regard to the breechloader.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
ZUNDNADELGEWEHR AND MITRAILLEUSE:  
EUROPE IN THE BREECHLOADER ERA, 1841-1877 
 
  Though the smell of gunpowder, the loud rapport of rifles and muskets firing, and 
the glint of bayonets remained the same, the  Second Schleswig War of 1864, the Austro-
Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War that followed four years later 
ushered in two new devices of military warfare. The success of the Dreyse Needle Gun, 
or as the Prussians named it Zundnadelgewehr, in the 1864 and 1866 wars demonstrated 
conclusively the superiority of breech-loading firearms, while the French conflict allowed 
generals to continue to refine the tactics of their employment, and demonstrated the effect 
of the new machine-gun, which armies did not adopt as rapidly as the breechloader. 
About the time of the close of the American Civil War, most of the world’s major 
militaries began adopting breech-loading firearms and experimenting with machine-guns. 
In Germany, the military loved the success of the Zundnadelgewehr, and the rapid defeat 
of the French caused the major armies to abandon Napoleonic infantry tactics. The 
adoption and standard issue of the rifle musket did not dramatically affect infantry tactics, 
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as the American Civil War demonstrated, but a quick firing breechloader and rapid-fire 
machine-guns caused all of the major militaries in the 1870s to create new doctrines and 
examine the lessons of the Wars of German Unification. 1 
  Prussia adopted the breech-loading rifle as standard issue in the 1840s, but 
because soldiers did not carry the weapon in combat until 1864, the majority of the 
world’s militaries, including the United States, ignored the concept, although they 
experimented with some breechloaders of their own. Once the weapon allowed the 
Prussians to win a quick, decisive campaign against the Danes, and later the Austrians, 
many armies quickly sought breech-loading rifles of their own.  The three wars launched 
by Otto von Bismarck, and the Zundnadelgewehr that his Prussian troops carried into 
battle ushered in a transformation of military thinking, tactics, and technology in Europe 
and overseas. 
  The Prussian army adopted the breech-loading Dreyse Zundnadelgewehr in 1840, 
and the weapon went into production the following year at a time when most militaries 
where still in the process of changing over from the flintlock muzzleloader to the 
percussion muzzle-loading musket.2 This weapon offered a greater rapidity of fire over a 
muzzle-loading musket. While the Prussians and others praised its effect in battle, the 
weapon initially did not cause a change in military tactics. Infantrymen in the American 
Civil War of 1861-1865, which occurred concurrently with Bismarck’s wars, fought with 
                                                          
1
 Charles Chesney, Observations on the Past and Present State of Firearms and on the Probable Effects in 
War of the New Musket (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1852), 270. This work will 
attempt to preserve the naming patterns given to weapons by their respective armies. For example, the 
French Chassepot rifle will be called Modèle 1866 Chassepot, not Model 1866; likewise, the Dreyse 
Zundnadelgewehr will more often than not be referred to as the Prussian Zundnadelgewehr, although it and 
needle-gun are used interchangeably; also European style machine-guns are called mitrailleuses, as they 
were named after the French pattern Reyffe and Montigny mitrailleuses. 
2
 G. L. M. Strauss, Men Who Have Made the New German Empire: A Series of Brief Biographical Sketches 
Volume II (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1875), 326. 
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muzzle-loading rifle muskets made in the United States, Britain, Austria, as well as 
antiquated smoothbore muskets, all the while using old Napoleonic infantry tactics.  
  The case of the Dreyse rifle highlights the two key items of resistance in 
improvements in weapons and tactics among militaries of the era. First, the Dreyse 
system did not actually see large-scale combat until the Austro-Prussian War, and 
because it was such a radical departure from conventional military weaponry, it was 
difficult even for the Prussians to accept such a radical design when Dreyse first showed 
the weapon to the army in 1835.3 Second, during this period most of the larger powers 
hated the idea of adopting foreign weaponry, preferring to wait until a native-born subject 
developed a suitable counterpart. In 1827, Dreyse had perfected the Zundnadelgewehr 
concept, and, although the weapon was still a muzzleloader, it was well ahead of the 
flintlocks then in use. Prussia refused to consider the weapon, and when Dreyse appealed 
to the Austrian government, they informed him “there was no lack of clever men in 
Austria!”4 Due to the Austrians failure to procure the weapon, and the Prussian 
government’s adoption of the rifle in 1840, the Austrians were at the same severe 
disadvantage in 1866 as the Danes were in 1864. The importance of the 
Zundnadelgewehr in the wars that created the modern German state, as well as its 
demonstration of the breech-loading rifle, cannot be underestimated.  G. L. M. Strauss 
stated in his biography of men who shaped Germany “had he [the minister who refused 
Dreyse] accordingly tried his hardest to secure the ingenious inventor for Austria!... many 
things might be different… the new German empire might still remain a bright dream in 
                                                          
3
 Strauss, New German Empire, 325. 
4
 Ibid., 324. 
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the pondering brains of German patriots!”5 In addition to the Zundnadelgewehr’s effect in 
Germany, its performance in the Wars of German Unification proved to be the catalyst 
that caused industrial powers to cast off the old muzzle-loading musket.6 
  Prussia’s army was the most revolutionary of the era, and other nations failed to 
adopt the novel firearm and slowly began changing to percussion muskets in the 1840s.7 
Despite the fact that something new was available, the failure to follow the path of 
Prussia in 1840 does not make these nations conservative. The Dreyse Zundnadelgewehr 
was untested in combat, and, even in peacetime, the primary arsenal delivered only 
300,000 weapons by 1863, a rate of only 12,500 per year, insufficient to reequip an army 
rapidly. Because the weapons continued to use paper cartridges, there was no way to seal 
off the breech of the rifle when the needle-shaped firing pin detonated the primer 
contained in the middle of the cartridge. The result was that some of the gas produced by 
the exploding gunpowder vented back into the shooter’s face, often injuring them.8 This 
flaw led W. C. Dodge, examiner at the United States Patent Office, in a treatise 
examining various breech-loading designs, to proclaim that the revolutionary 
Zundnadelgewehr was “confessedly the most imperfect of all breechloaders."9 Certainly, 
the weapon was not without flaws, and the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated its 
weaknesses, but its initial advantages were its rate of fire, accuracy, and the ability of a 
                                                          
5
 Ibid. 
6
 “The Military Armaments of the Five Great Powers,” The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, 
Science, and Art 12 (January 1868), 73. 
7
 Louis Panot, “A Treatise on Small Arms, Part One,” The United Service Magazine 69 (June 1852), 262. 
8
 Henry Smith Williams and Edward Hunting Williams, Modern Warfare (New York: Hearst’s 
International Library Company, 1915), 80. 
9
 W. C. Dodge, Breech-Loaders Versus Muzzle-Loaders, or How to Strengthen Our Army and Crush the 
Rebellion With a Saving of Life and Treasure (Washington, DC: Ed. A. Stephens, 1864), 10. 
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soldier to load and fire while prone, an advantage not shared by enemies with muskets.10  
  The Austrians were perhaps the most resistant to the Zundnadelgewehr concept. 
They complained that the needle was weak and likely to break, the gas problems made 
the weapon unsafe, and that the rifle had poor accuracy. They also argued that a high rate 
of fire encouraged soldiers to waste ammunition, a complaint echoed even more fervently 
once militaries began to debate the validity of the magazine-rifle concept in the late 
1870s. Further, while innovative, Austria claimed that many of the Zundnadelgewehre 
were of poor manufacture, and used these excuses to justify the continued use of muzzle-
loading weapons.11 
  In 1864, a Prussian army soundly beat a Danish force armed with muzzleloaders, 
but except for one nation, this development caused no radical change in firearms design 
in Europe. Only the British, keen as ever to give its army an advantage in the field, 
understood the lesson: that a breech-loading-rifle armed army would best an enemy 
equipped with a muzzleloader. In 1866, disregarding the patriotic-inspired closed-
mindedness displayed by, Britain adopted a breech-loading system devised by the 
American inventor Jacob Snider to its trusty Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle musket (See 
Figures One and Two). This rifle musket served the British Empire through the Crimean 
War, equipped Union and Confederate troops in the American Civil War, and proved 
readily adaptable for conversion.12 This conversion added a receiver and breechblock for 
use with a metallic cartridge, while utilizing the original lock, stock, barrel, and bands of 
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the musket.13 
  The British experience with their new Snider-Enfields was characteristic of 
Europe and demonstrated both the reluctance to adopt newer and better rifles and 
commitment to weapon systems that worked, and worked well. The author of an 1867 
article discussed how prior to successful testing of the rifle many in the army believed it 
would fail, explode, or somehow prove unsatisfactory. But, by 1867, the author noted that 
the Snider rifle was a “complete success,” with many rifles firing well over thirty 
thousand rounds without incident, and without any serious accident.14 This revised 
statement was after the army adopted new cartridges for the weapon, as the original 
Boxer cartridge caused numerous catastrophic explosions in the weapons. While the 
design of the rifle was critical, ammunition design and a successful cartridge were just as 
important, and while this author saw the rifle as successful, many continued to view the 
Snider with skepticism.15 
  The author discussed that in 1867 the British army reevaluated the Snider system, 
to see if it was a decent breech-loading system or if a better one existed. He argued the 
Snider was the best system, but still needed improvement, and hoped that a better rifle 
would supersede the Snider eventually.16 By the late 1860s, regarding the breech-loading 
rifle, Britain showed a remarkable lack of conservatism in adopting the Snider so quickly 
after the 1864 conflict and replacing it with the iconic Martini-Henry in 1871 (See 
Figures Three and Four).  
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  The Dreyse Zundnadelgewehr’s combat debut demonstrated that breech-loading 
rifles were the weapons of the future, and concurrently with the Austro-Prussian War, the 
armies of Europe and North America sought similar weapons. Just like in Denmark, 
infantrymen armed with muzzleloaders stood no chance against trained troops with 
faster-firing repeaters. Britain and the United States began experimenting with the new 
style rifles before the war, but after the war, most nations conducted similar trials. Of the 
many experimental rifle designs, few became standard issue. The Prussians and their new 
rifle soundly beat the Austrians with their Lorenz rifle muskets with the result every 
major nation adopted a breech-loading rifle of some sort by 1870. Many, like the British 
Snider, the American Springfield, and the Austrian Werndl, were conversions of muzzle-
loading muskets. Others, like the French Modèle 1866 Chassepot were improved versions 
of the Zundnadelgewehr. Some, like the Swiss Vetterli, were entirely new designs. 17 
  The Zundnadelgewehr was not the first breechloader used in combat. The Sharps 
and Spencer rifles and carbines, along with a handful of other designs, all saw service in 
the American Civil War, mainly in the form of cavalry carbines where muzzle loading 
was too unwieldy. The Austro-Prussian War was significant in that it was the first large 
scale – and European – conflict that involved a breech-loading infantry rifle. Other 
nations had already begun to create breech-loading rifles, but the conflict provided the 
impetus for nations to adopt workable, reliable, and militarily adequate systems.18  
  The French understood the shock of the defeat of the Austrians the most, and their 
army rushed to perfect the Chassepot rifle. Austria was a major military power, which 
made its rapid defeat more surprising and made the other powers willing to examine the 
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lessons of that war. By the beginning of the war in 1870, the French had over one million 
Chassepot Rifles and close to two million muskets, while the Prussians had more 
Zundnadelgewehre (almost 1,097,000) but no muskets to supplement their arsenal. More 
importantly, the French had machine-guns, the deadly mitrailleuse, patterned after the 
American Gatling gun.19 The Franco-Prussian War showed that the breech-loading rifle 
was a permanent fixture of military doctrine, and that the machine-gun was a deadly 
weapon that still needed a solid tactic of employment.  
  The French lost the war, in part because of their Chassepots. They were rush 
developments to counter the new Prussian threats, and had not been tested in strenuous 
circumstances. In an effort to seal the breech end of the weapon, they employed a rubber 
washer that expanded on firing. These washers quickly lost their seal after firing several 
rounds, rendering the weapon unusable without hazard to the soldier. The Dreyse was 
still not completely safe for the soldier carrying it, but it was at least reliable compared to 
the Chassepot.20 When properly cared for, however, the rubber rings kept the Chassepot 
from venting gas into the shooter’s face like the Zundnadelgewehr.21 
  Historian Geoffrey Wawro has a different opinion on the Chassepot, exalting its 
successes and abilities over its disadvantageous. The Chassepot had a greater range than 
the Zundnadelgewehr, allowing French soldiers to fire into Prussian lines well before the 
latter could respond with their weapons. Certainly, as he argues, a soldier with a 
Chassepot “could” hit a target at twelve hundred yards, but post-war examinations, 
especially from Britain, cast doubt on the actually real effect of such shooting, instead 
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suggesting such firing had an effect solely on morale.22 
  The British, during and after the Franco-Prussian War, were dismissive of the 
capabilities of the Chassepot. W. W. Greener, a British gun maker and firearms expert, 
wrote a treatise on breech-loading weapons during the nineteenth century.23 He argued 
that the Chassepot was a horribly inaccurate weapon, with far worse accuracy than the 
British Snider and the early Martini-Henry, describing the French adoption of the 
Chassepot as “a mistake.”24 Indeed, three years after the war the French abandoned the 
Chassepot and its paper cartridge and adopted the Gras conversion that converted the rifle 
into a metallic-cartridge weapon. The firearm featured new production models, the 
Modèle 1874 rifle as well as the Modèle 1866-74 conversion of the Chassepot.25  
  Franco-Prussian War was also the last action for the weapon that changed military 
tactics in the mid-nineteenth century. The fragile needle firing pin of the 
Zundnadelgewehr tended to break after firing just one hundred rounds, making the 
weapon accurate but not durable. The Prussians liked the concept of a stronger, more 
durable firing mechanism, as displayed by the Chassepot, and two new gun inventers, 
Peter and Wilhelm Mauser, designed a rifle that featured a self-cocking bolt with a more 
reliable firing pin. The new German army adopted this weapon as the Infanterie Gewehr 
1871 Mauser, which also featured a smaller caliber and longer range compared to the old 
needle gun.26  
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  While it took two decades for major armies to not only adopt machine-guns but 
also to create workable doctrines for them, the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated that a 
modern army had to have a breech-loading rifle. Beyond a simple breechloader, the rifle 
had to be accurate, safe, and have a decent rate of fire; the equipment was not the only 
result of the war, however. The French continued to use their famous massed column 
attack, a leftover from the days of Napoleon Bonaparte. The result was that Prussian 
soldiers, taking quick but steady aim inflicted horrendous casualties on the close-ordered 
French soldiers. Of all of the many attacks French troops launched on Prussian 
formations, none succeeded due to the effect of Prussian fire.27 Such a lesson 
demonstrated that because the weapons had changed, infantry, artillery, and cavalry 
tactics all reexamination and updating.  
   In the decade that followed the Franco-Prussian War, all of the major militaries, 
including the United States, began to reorganize their army and examine the lessons of 
the conflict. Armies still credited the Germans as being the catalyst for reforms, and 
every power, to some degree, began to change and adopt new technologies based on the 
Prussian system. Charles Vincent’s 1875 lecture focused on the European armies in 
peacetime, and as a survey of their reforms, he also clearly indicated that the German 
army and its performance in France in 1870 enthralled all of Europe.28 
  While the lessons of the war of 1870 were the foundations for military reform in 
the following decade, nations closely watched each other, seeing how they incorporated 
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the lessons of the conflict or if some new invention became paramount. Gone was the 
reluctance and timidity as expressed by Austria over the Zundnadelgewehr. Russia, 
whose army was among the largest of Europe was “eagerly watched by ourselves, by all 
of Europe” according to Vincent.29 His lecture focused primarily on the strengths of 
European armies, how they gained recruits or conscripts, as well as how quickly they 
mobilized reserves and marched against a power, as well as technological developments 
and acquisitions of new weaponry. The top of his list was Germany, followed by Austria, 
Russia, France, and Italy. He classified England as having a “2nd Class” army.30 In 
addition, he noted that of the fifteen European armies he examined, most had adopted a 
breechloader by 1875, only five years after it proved its effectiveness. 31 
  In the 1870s, Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia, who commanded the Prussian 
Second Army in the Franco-Prussian War, wrote a treatise entitled The Influence of 
Firearms Upon Tactics, a critique of the Zundnadelgewehr, the Chassepot, the 
mitrailleuse, the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War, and how tactics changed because of 
the weapons. While much of the work was a simple history tracing the use of firearms 
from the flintlock musket, through the rifle, and then the breechloader, the last part 
focused on the lessons of the war and as tactics necessary to employ the new rifles 
successfully, as well as how to minimize casualties. The work also showed the optimism 
of the Germans, as its author coolly claimed that, with regard to the Austro-Prussian War, 
“The campaign of 1866 dazzled nobody in the Prussian army.” Prince Karl gave the 
impression that the Prussians planned for the war to last only seven weeks, and that the 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., 557. 
30
 Ibid., 565. 
31
 Ibid., 551-554. 
23 
 
victory was certain.32 
  Prior to the mass standardization of the rifled weapon in 1855, opposing infantry 
formations engaged each other at relatively close range. After the American Civil War, 
which had seen Napoleonic tactics, armies reevaluated the linear, close-range volley 
tactics. In 1870, French troops fired their Chassepots at long range, hoping to take 
advantage of the flatter trajectory of its bullet to not only help accuracy but also drive 
away enemy formations. Prince Karl noted that occasionally they did make an impact, 
but French riflemen largely wasted their fire, and by firing at extreme range squandered 
any benefits they might have gained from a quick-firing rifle.33 
  Among the tactics that quickly proved unsuitable in the face of the breechloader 
was that of massed infantry formations. Both the Prussians and the French changed their 
doctrine to rely more heavily on skirmishers, as loose-formations of individual soldiers 
made difficult targets for quick-firing, accurate rifles and artillery.34 Cavalry tactics also 
changed. While the introduction of the rifled weapon severely hampered any chance of 
success, a quick-firing breechloader made the success of a cavalry charge extremely 
unlikely.35 
  Many theorists advocated the abolishment of linear tactics altogether in the 
aftermath of the French conflict, an idea that met with fierce resistance in Britain. Most 
tacticians did not deny that skirmishers became more vital with the breechloader, but 
conservative strategists objected fiercely to the calls that armies would be giant masses of 
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loose, difficult-to-control infantry formations. British army Lieutenant Colonel W. J. 
Williams decried the use of what he called “swarms of skirmishers,” arguing that “in 
their impatience of our old steady drill, and of our regulation of withdrawing skirmishers 
that we may have a steady line in front, some of our reformers are carried too far.”36 
Rather than accept that German skirmishers carried the day, Williams argued that it was 
“German regulation” that won the battle, noting that the Prussians had not attempted 
more skirmish-based tactics except against second-rate French units, as they beat the 
French regulars with more conservative tactics.37  
  Historian Geoffrey Wawro, whose writings on the Austro-Prussian and Franco-
Prussian conflicts contain negative assessments of the Zundnadelgewehr argues that the 
Prussian needle-gun was not a decisive factor in either conflict, arguing instead it was the 
tactics, inadequate supplies, and poor leadership of the Austrian and French armies that 
led to the Prussian victory. Against the Chassepot, which was a superior weapon, he 
argued that the German rifle could only reliably hit targets up to six hundred yards 
distant, while the French weapon was accurate to twelve hundred yards.38 Wawro ignores 
the fact that the French army trained to open fire at only 875 yards, meaning that while 
the Chassepot did have an advantage on German weapon, it was only by 275 yards as 
opposed to 600. He argues the effect of the new French breechloader was so much that 
Prussian soldiers had an “erotic admiration” for the weapon.39 The French regular troops 
had better equipment than the Prussians, and the famed weapon that revolutionized 
tactics and won the 1866 war was obsolete by 1871. Wawro concludes artillery, that is 
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quick-firing, breech-loading artillery, decided the conflict, not the Dreyse or the 
Chassepot.40 
  After the Franco-Prussian War, tactical observers in France and abroad began to 
interpret the lessons of the conflict and recommend reforms. Williams argued that the 
infantry tactics had to be changed. He noted that the British officer received training in 
how to focus the fire of his men to maximum effect, but that no doctrine existed for 
minimizing casualties because of the withering fire of an enemy armed with breech-
loading rifles. While Prince Karl argued that breechloaders allowed the infantry to open 
fire at longer ranges, he never commented on what the optimum range was. In 1872, the 
British considered “musketry range”, the range at where rifle fire could be commenced 
with some degree of accuracy, to be seven hundred yards.41 The French in 1869 
maneuvers, firing at stationary targets, engaged in rifle training at ranges from 100 to 500 
yards individually, with battalion firing at 800 meters, or almost 875 yards.42 While 
Wawro argues that the French fired at a range of twelve hundred meters in the conflict, 
citing the testimony of a Bavarian Lieutenant.43 The rifle may have been capable of 
effective fire at that distance, but it is highly unlikely that the French infantry battalion 
drilled to fire at one range and then began a new series of tactics as soon as war began.  
  As the breechloader had become an accepted part of land warfare – and proved 
that older weapons and tactics were now obsolete, officers in European armies struggled 
to create reforms to address these new developments. Major Jones, who served in the 
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Prussian Guard, gave a paper in 1872 about changes in the Prussian drill manual. His 
findings were particularly surprising. He claimed that the new manual was an updated 
version of the 1847 manual, but the additions were small considering the perfection of 
breechloaders, the mass issue of rifled weapons, and the stunning defeat over Austria. 
The Prussians adopted the work just prior to the French war, but Major Jones noted that it 
contained barely anything related to recent experience over Austria in 1866.44 The 
importance of Jones’s work is clear, that the breechloader gave an attacking army an 
advantage, but armies did not need to adjust their tactics until the enemy possessed a 
breechloader. It also demonstrates that conservatism, at least in its classical form applied 
to military terminology, was endemic in all military powers of the era. 
  In the wake of the three European conflicts that occurred between 1864 and 1871, 
most countries began a rearmament program. Many adopted conversions of muskets out 
of economic expediency, while others began to experiment with machineguns as the 
French had employed them to deadly effect in the Franco-Prussian War. Among those 
powers, Charles Vincent noted that every power eyed Russia to see what that country 
would do in terms of reform; before his lecture in June of 1875, he spent time in Russia 
understanding their military structure and, in particular, their army and the improvement 
programs it began.  
  The Russian army needed reform in the 1870s because it, too, suffered from the 
conservatism that befell most of the armies of the era, but also because it still had not 
reorganized after the defeat in the Crimean War of the 1850s. In that war, where France 
primarily used the Minié rifle and the British the Pattern 1853 Enfield Rifle Musket, 
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eighty-percent of all Russian troops carried percussion smoothbore muskets, and only 
thirteen-percent had rifled weapons of any kind. Some even carried flintlocks into 
battle.45  In the years that followed Russian officers “made exhaustive studies of native 
and foreign systems,” attempting to determine on a rifle system to standardize on, as the 
Russian army tried to rearm to be an equal of other European powers. As a defeated 
force, the Russian Army sought to modernize itself, adopting new, breech-loading, rifles 
and Gatling guns, revolvers, and modern ammunition, all by the outbreak of the Russo-
Turkish War in 1877. 46 
  One of the reforms that Vincent noted the Russians took from the Franco-Prussian 
War was the issue of rifle sights and distances of firing. He noted that an infantry 
battalion in the Russian army included both rifle and infantry companies, although they 
used the same weapon. The Krinck-converted musket was the standard weapon while he 
was there, although the army had accepted the Berdan rifle, designed by American Hiram 
Berdan, for use.47 The lesson of firepower that the Russian army learned was the same 
one that Strauss wrote of in 1875: that the French, by firing at long range, had wasted 
ammunition without achieving any significant result. Thus, the eight sharpshooters per 
company and the rifle companies had firearms with adjustable sights up to twelve 
hundred yards, while the sights of the regular infantry’s Berdans and Krnkas were limited 
to six hundred yards, one hundred yards less than what the British considered “musketry 
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range.”48 Clearly, the Russians wanted their troops to save their fire until it was most 
effective. 
  While the Europeans watched the Russians to see how they reformed, no one was 
envious of their cavalry. Certainly, Vincent praised the Russian cavalry’s speed at 
mobilizing, but in armament, something that the 1870 war showed dramatically changed 
tactics and strategy, was deficient. He noted that, for instance, the cavalry pistol the 
Russian trooper carried was a model dating from 1839 – obsolescent, and one “no one 
would dare fire.”49 Such a statement suggests less that the firearm design was unsafe, and 
more that the arms, being so old, were in a state of disrepair and that faulty maintenance, 
was responsible for the arm being dangerous. This anecdote demonstrated that while the 
Russian army was in the process of reform, much of its military equipment was 
horrendously outdated – each European army wanted up-to-date weapons, but in this 
case, the Russian cavalry carried an old, worn-out, obsolete, and possibly unsafe sidearm. 
  The Russians were also notable for reform because they purchased a large amount 
of machine-guns. The problem remained that neither they, nor any other European power, 
knew precisely how to classify them or how to employ them effectively. Vincent noted 
that Russia possessed four hundred of these mitrailleuses, disposed of in fifty batteries of 
eight each.50  Much like Dreyse’s weapon in 1835, the machine-gun had not become an 
accepted weapon. Vincent argued that the Russians ordered the guns out of fear when 
Prussia invaded France in 1870, but by 1872, many of the older officers refused to accept 
them as tactically valid pieces of equipment. Such an argument occurred almost 
internationally, especially the United States, once again calling in to question the 
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perceived idea of “conservatism” in many of the militaries of the world. In addition, no 
one in the Russian army was sure how to employ the weapons, some wanted to use them 
as artillery pieces while others wanted batteries scattered out to different infantry 
regiments or brigades. The Russians decided not to employ these guns at the company 
level, as having them close to the front exposed them to capture by cavalry. Despite 
whatever benefits having them at the point of action would have brought, keeping them 
safe was of prime importance.51 
  Much of the skepticism of machine-guns came from their actual usage in both the 
Franco-Prussian War and later the American Indian Wars. The Reyffe mitrailleuse and 
American Gatling Gun were both revolving guns, and both were not particularly 
successful. The American Army did not like the Gatling gun in Indian fighting, mainly 
because it, like most other nations’ machine-guns, was used as artillery. The weapon used 
a rifle-caliber round similar to that used in the Springfield, and because officers employed 
them as artillery, they had difficulty spotting the fall of shot. While use against a tightly-
packed Napoleonic-style European line might have produced results, as a gunner just 
needed to see the line crumble, use against a dispersed and concealed enemy like Indians 
made observing the effects of fire difficult. The weapons had rates of fire of about 350 
rounds per minute, but the weapons easily jammed, as the fouling generated by black 
powder was not entirely suitable for automatic weapons.52 
  The Reyffe mitrailleuse was not much better. It had a limited range, only about 
four hundred yards, and the French used it as light artillery, and because of the short 
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range, it had to get in close to the action.53 Such a short range is in extreme juxtaposition 
with the French tactic of having their infantry open fire at 875 yards, well over 475 yards 
past the effective range of the Reyffe. Such a limitation of the mitrailleuse meant that it 
was not an effective weapon and, while its usage caused modernizing nations like Russia 
to adopt them, once European armies began to reexamine the weapons after the Franco-
Prussian War, many did not see them nearly as advantageous as previously thought. 
United States Army Captain John H. Parker, who commanded the Gatling Gun 
Detachment at San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War, wrote a treatise on 
machine-gun usage and argued that when brought into action, especially at the Battle of 
Gravelotte, the Reyffes were effective in halting Prussian advances. He noted that in 
hindsight, commentators saw such lessons, but most military theorists argued in the 
1870s that the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated the futility of machine-guns.54 He also 
argued that the defeat of France by Prussia soured most of Europe on the machine-gun, 
because the nation that lost the war was the only one to employ them.55 The 
Zundnadelgewehr spurred development of the breechloader because the troops carrying 
them won, but those gunners with mitrailleuses lost the war, and in doing so delayed 
global adoption of the weapon. The machine-guns were effective in some battles, but 
failed in the larger, strategic sense. Part of their failure stems from the gunners, who 
rather than firing against a body of men, instead aimed at a single soldier, firing upwards 
of thirty rounds on the solitary target, leaving little of the man behind.56 The weapons had 
an impact on the morale of enemy troops, but because of their limited tactical uses, a lack 
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of fixed doctrine, and ammunition expenditure failed to achieve a defined place in 
military circles. 
  One of the most oft-repeated arguments by European powers against 
breechloaders, long-range firing, and machine-guns was the difficulty of ammunition 
supply. Such an argument was important, as ammunition was not contained in clips or 
detachable magazines for rifles, and the ammunition was large, bulky, and heavy. Army 
transport was always a concern as was getting the ammunition to the front. For the 
individual soldier, he only carried a limited number of rounds, and most of them were 
inaccessible during a firefight. In maneuvers in 1869, a British officer observed that 
French infantrymen carrying Modèle 1866 Chassepots carried only forty rounds easily 
accessible in pouches, the rest resided in the soldiers’ knapsacks.57 Wawro claims that the 
total ammunition load out for a   Russian troops in 1872 carried ninety rounds, with only 
thirty being accessible pouches, with sixty in the knapsack.58 In a heavy firefight, 
assuming a steady fire of five-rounds per minute, the soldier would be rummaging in his 
knapsack within ten minutes of entering combat, leaving the front open to a steady 
advance by the enemy. Moreover, carrying extra rounds in the transport train was no easy 
matter; for example in the Russian army, the company transport wagon held forty 
additional rounds per man, the artillery reserves another sixty.59 Thus, while on paper for 
an engagement an army might allot upwards of two-hundred rounds per man, actually 
supplying the soldier with more than what he carried was problematic at best.  
  For the new mitrailleuses, the problem of ammunition supply was even worse. 
The four hundred pieces that Russia acquired in 1872 arrived with 6,290 rounds of 
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ammunition in cases of about 24 rounds each, and a single ammo cart carrying the entire 
allotment served each gun. The Russian mitrailleuse was a ten-barrel Gatling design, and 
was of the same .42-caliber as the Berdan rifle. These weapons could produce a massive 
amount of firepower quickly, but assuming a rate of fire of twenty rounds per minute per 
barrel, a rate of which the British Snider-Enfield managed easily in 1867, a single day’s 
engagement would exhaust the entire compliment of .42-caliber cartridges given to the 
Russian mitrailleuse batteries.60 If the guns achieved the rate of fire of an American 
Gatling gun, or 350 rounds per minute, a Russian mitrailleuse would deplete the entire 
ammunition allotted to it in 1872 in less than twenty minutes of sustained firing. 
  This supposed wasteful expenditure of ammunition supply was at the heart of 
concern against machine-guns or magazine rifles, but commanders even scrutinized 
breech-loading rifles as well. Wawro reported that frenzied Prussian troops tended to 
“blaze away recklessly,” as only one out of every 250 Zundnadelgewehr rounds struck its 
mark.61 Such an accuracy rate was similar to that of a rifle musket, including the type 
then in use by the Austrians, many of which Union and Confederate troops had used in 
the American Civil War.62 American commentators, defending the adoption of 
breechloaders during the American Civil War, argued that because the breechloader had a 
rapid rate of fire, rather than wasting ammunition, the weapon gave a soldier confidence 
and kept him from panicking and wasting ammunition.63 Whether or not soldiers 
panicked, the fact the weapons did fire faster than a rifle musket caused increased 
expenditure of ammunition. In action at Spicheren on August 6, 1870, the infantry of 
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General Charles Vergé’s division fired their Chassepots feverishly, firing 146,000 
cartridges, which represented one-third of French daily ammunition production. If the 
other two divisions of the French corps at Spicheren fired amounts even close to that 
number on the same day, then one corps-sized battle would consume an entire day’s 
production of ammunition.64 French employment of a second type of rifle, the fusil à 
tabatiére, a breech-loading conversion, for the Gardes Mobile, which utilized different 
ammunition, and mitrailleuses, meant that larger infantry battles would, by their nature, 
consume more ammunition than Spicheren all made French ammunition supply 
precarious.65 
  The concern of ammunition supply, while most vocally expressed in the early 
1870s as regarding French tactics with the Chassepot, were at the heart of military 
concern of new, modern quick firing weaponry. A breech-loading rifle let a soldier fire 
more quickly, even when using self-contained paper cartridges, than a soldier who had to 
pour powder, ram a ball, and then prime his weapon. All militaries desired a weapon with 
a quicker rate of fire, but until suitable methods of carrying more cartridges on the 
soldier’s body and until transport trains could adequately handle the demand, generals 
within those armies remained skeptical, or at least wary of the rapid expenditure of 
ammunition for little gain. Further, large battles would consume ammunition at the rate 
seen in the Franco-Prussian War; increased use of machine-guns or magazine-fed 
weapons would exacerbate these problems. 
  For defenders of these tactics, the benefits of firing at long range and rapid fire 
were not to inflict casualties but “to do damage and to shake morale,” which was about 
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the only effect achieved when the French executed battalion firing at a distance of eight 
hundred meters during maneuvers in August 1869.66 General Sir William Cordington 
observed a French instructor who achieved a rate of seventeen rounds per minute with a 
Chassepot, which while it could damage morale when employed at a real enemy would 
quickly exhaust a man’s ready compliment of forty rounds. Cordington quickly 
commented though that for the instructor to achieve the rate of fire was wholly 
unrealistic, the cartridges were carried in the soldier’s hand and arm, a process that 
probably would have resulted in their loss should the method be tried in combat.67 The 
greatest immediate effect of the Franco-Prussian War was to show that breech-loading 
rifles were from then on the standard arm of the infantry, but acceptable and effective 
doctrines for their employment took many years to devise.  
  Another lesson that the European nations took from the Franco-Prussian War was 
that of discipline. F. N. Maude, writing in the 1880s, noted that a company of two 
hundred Prussian infantry, armed with zundnadelgewehre broke up a charge of three 
thousand French cavalry. He argued that discipline and the control of fire counted for 
more than simply rapid fire and the stereotypical “wall of lead” against an enemy.68 
These arguments not only reinforced the breech-loading concept, but also served as a 
detriment to the theory of magazine rifles. It also demonstrated that cavalry became 
increasingly outmoded on a battlefield dominated by accurate, repeating weapons. 
  Though as late as 1872 armies considered long-range firing of rifles wasteful, by 
the end of the decade the value of such a tactic had become apparent. Later tacticians, 
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perhaps the “younger” group of officers of which Colonel Vincent spoke of, that existed 
in every army, claimed by 1881 that of the lessons “taken deeply to heart by all European 
military powers,” the first was “the value of long-range infantry fire, by which alone the 
true advantages of the modern rifle are gained.”69 So wrote Captain Walter H. James of 
the Royal Engineers. James was certainly an optimist, but apparently gathered different 
conclusions from the Franco-Prussian War than others. Rather than being of the opinion 
that long range fire, considered by the French to be about 800 meters or about 875 yards, 
was wasteful, he wrote in 1880 that armies would commence firing with infantry at 
ranges of two thousand yards, just over one mile, against “suitable targets,” though he did 
not denote what a suitable target was.70 James is best classed as one of the younger, 
“radical” officers as such a tactic was clearly wishful thinking, as a man-sized target 
would be impossible to hit, and, by the time an enemy closed to a practical range, soldiers 
would expend most of their ammunition. If a soldier had forty rounds accessible, 
assuming a soldier fired two rounds every one hundred yards on the advance, then at a 
range of five hundred yards they would have only ten rounds remaining when the action 
was fiercest.  
  James was too mesmerized by the fierce sound of rifles chattering away and the 
terrible power they, and new breech-loading artillery, projected. He argued that instead of 
dislodging an enemy from his entrenched position, as armies had done for centuries, the 
object was to weaken their morale by firing at long ranges and with such rapidity as to 
increase the effect of rounds landing on target. He argued that magazine rifles, as used by 
Turkish forces at the battle of Plevna in 1877, demonstrated that volume of fire, not 
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individual accuracy or rapidity, determined who won or lost a battle. Rather than expose 
men to the withering barrage of magazine fire, James argued that infantry should engage 
at longer ranges where the mass volume of fire was bound to do damage. 71 
  The discussion of magazine rifles during the period of the Franco-Prussian War 
and the decade that followed is significant because, except for a few officers, line officers 
of the major military powers typically did not discuss or advocate the need for repeating 
arms in Europe. None of the officers seemed concerned by the fact that as their nations 
finally began to adopt second-generation breechloaders, that is to say, rifles that were not 
converted muskets, Switzerland adopted as standard issue, a magazine-fed repeating rifle 
for its army. The Swiss Vetterli rifle carried eleven cartridges in a tubular magazine, not 
unlike the American Winchester of Western fame. It was a bolt action, much like the 
Chassepot or Zundnadelgewehr, suitable as a single loader or a repeater, and used 
metallic cartridges.72 Three years later, in 1872, the Austrians adopted the Frühwirth rifle, 
a magazine fed repeater, but only for its gendarme while its regular army troops soldiered 
on with a breechloader.73 A European army possessed a magazine rifle, while another’s 
police force used a similar weapon, and the United States used Henry, Winchester, and 
Spencer magazine rifles and carbines but not primarily as standard issue. The other 
nations, including the United States ignored this development and discussed ways to 
improve the single-shot rifle.  
  The Swiss Vetterli in 1869 was exactly what the Prussian Zundnadelgewehr had 
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been in 1841 – too early to cause a shift in tactics, and occurring at a time when nations 
were in the process of changing over outdated firearms. The armies of Europe chose to 
continue testing the new breechloaders they experimented with at the end of the 1860s, 
and ignored the Swiss rifle. Only the Italians liked the rifle as well and in 1871 adopted 
the Vetterli for the own use, on the condition that it not have a magazine (See Figures 
Nine, Ten, and Twelve). The Italians did not regret such an omission, until the shift 
towards new arms caused them to install a magazine system some sixteen years later, as 
they considered their version of the arm equal of all of Europe.74 Such an adoption proves 
that it was not that the rifle was of a bad design. Instead, the Italian army’s adoption of 
the Vetterli rifle, without a magazine, shows that European armies wanted a good breech-
loading, single-shot rifle that had a high rate of fire, but they did not want it to have a 
magazine. Certainly, tubular magazine rifles were not safe as there was always the danger 
of the nose of a bullet striking the primer of the cartridge in front of it, causing a 
premature detonation. The fact remains that, during or just following the Franco-Prussian 
War, two nations had access to a common rifle with a magazine that was standard 
infantry issue and, for all of the reforms the war inspired, the war moved no army to 
adopt a magazine-fed rifle. That lesson had to wait until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, 
when Ottoman soldiers inflicted massive casualties with a weapon the United States 
already decided should not be standard issue and was inferior. 
  Much of the hesitation towards magazine arms, and, indeed, the lack of interest in 
them, stemmed from their rates of fire. Commentators after the Russo-Turkish War noted 
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that single loaders fired as fast as a magazine-fed weapon.75 Even in the 1890s, as 
changing over to magazine rifles became inevitable, American Army officers noted that 
magazine fire did not increase rate of fire significantly.76 The magazine rifle in the 1870s 
shared a role with the machine-gun as it was too new, wasteful of ammunition, and did 
not offer any then-discernable benefit over weaponry already in service. In addition, by 
1878, these nations had just adopted new breechloaders in the wake of the Franco-
Prussian War and changing over to yet another new rifle would have cost even more. As 
technology improved, nations were hesitant to purchase more firearms beyond current 
requirements.77 This reluctance was similar to the timidity that kept Europe from 
adopting a breechloader in the 1850s after it had just recently adopted percussion 
muskets. 
  The Wars of German Unification prompted rearmament in Europe because the 
technology was readily available and demonstrated its usefulness. The Prussians had used 
the Zundnadelgewehr since 1841 and triumphed over three European powers. The 
French, meanwhile, with machine-guns lost their war in 1871 and in doing so failed to 
cause widespread, rapid adoption of machine-guns. 
  The German Wars of Unification caused all nations to adopt breech-loading rifles, 
but in the decade following each nation attempted to devise how to use them the most 
effectively. The majority of the debates, which affected machine-guns and magazine 
weapons as well, revolved around the expenditure of ammunition. During the decade, 
each nation accepted a breech-loading firearm as standard issue, but because of 
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uncertainty on how to employ them, concerns about ammunition, and the costs involved 
for the most part did not adopt magazine rifles and treated machine-guns only as 
experimental weapons, unsure of their exact usage on the battlefield. The French, by 
employing the mitrailleuse and losing the war in 1871 delayed the mass adoption of 
machine-guns simply because a victorious nation rarely adopts the methods of those they 
have beaten on the field of battle. European-style militaries were willing to adapt and 
change their tactics and weapons, so long as something new was available, proven in 
combat, and used by a European victor in war. If a weapon, no matter how remarkable, 
failed that criteria, the generals disregarded it in favor of equipment they knew and loved. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
“BETTER THAN THE MUCH-VAUNTED PRUSSIAN NEEDLE-GUN:” 
THE AMERICAN ARMY’S SEARCH FOR A RIFLE, 1864-1869 
 
  Most soldiers who clashed in the American Civil War generally carried some type 
of muzzle-loading weapon, but the conflict was unique in that, while most troops carried 
smoothbore muskets or new, accurate, rifle muskets, many Union cavalrymen and some 
infantrymen carried breech-loading rifles. These new rifles, as Prussia saw with the 
adoption of its Zundnadelgewehr, offered troops increased rates of fire, range, accuracy, 
and reliability over muzzle-loading weapons. Experiences in the Civil War caused the 
United States Army to become interested in breech-loading rifles as standard issue, and 
between 1864 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the United States Army developed 
and examined breechloaders of its own, as well as those in use in European armies. While 
the Dreyse needle-gun failed to cause a change in global firearms technology in 1841, use 
of breechloaders in combat in the American Civil War, the Danish War of 1864, and the 
Austro-Prussian War of 1866 motivated armies of the world to adopt the new weapons. 
The United States, because of the Civil War and examination of European firearms, 
began the process of selecting a breech- loading firearm as standard issue well before the 
wars of German unification caused European militaries to do so.
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  The desire for breech-loading rifles was nothing new to the United States Army. 
In 1819, the army adopted in limited numbers a flintlock breechloader, the Model 1819 
Hall rifle. First adopted in 1819, armories updated the rifle in 1832, and Harpers Ferry, 
one of the two national armories of the United States, produced almost twenty thousand 
examples between the adoption of the weapon and 1840.1 While not standard issue like 
the Prussian Zundnadelgewehr, it demonstrates that the United States expressed interest 
in the breechloader before the Prussians adopted one as standard issue, and experimented 
with new, potentially useful, designs. 
  In 1854, fourteen years after armories ceased production of the Hall rifle, 
Congress appropriated ninety-thousand dollars for the procurement of breech-loading 
small arms, and the Ordnance Department tested examples later used during the Civil 
War: The Maynard, Burnside, Sharp’s, Green, Gibb, and Merrill rifle and carbine, among 
others. In 1857, the army convened one of many future boards to determine the feasibility 
of adopting a breechloader as standard issue, and to decide on which one.  Like many of 
the boards that followed, they 1857 panel did not recommend any specific arm, although 
in this instance the board gave preference to the Burnside carbine.2 Later, the army 
adopted a magazine weapon, the Spencer, which caused supply problems due to its 
metallic cartridge but “proved a potent factor in the triumph of Union forces on more 
than one occasion.”3  
  The army was not conservative because it did not adopt a breech-loading rifle as 
standard issue in 1857. Only two years previously, in 1855, the army adopted the Model 
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1855 Springfield Rifle Musket. Regular troops had not all received the new weapon when 
the board convened. Trial and experience with these new weapons influenced decisions, 
but even at such a stage when only Prussia had a standard issue breechloader, the 
American Army began considering their merits. At this time, other nations followed the 
example of the Crimean War and began adopting rifle muskets. The United States simply 
acted as every other major power did at this stage. 
  In the Civil War, breech-loading and magazine-fed, repeating firearms were not 
standard issue, and used mostly by cavalry. Western troops were the primary employers 
of these weapons, and most Eastern units continued to carry rifle muskets. But, between 
1863 and 1865, enough troops used these new weapons in combat for the army to begin 
to gauge their effectiveness.4 Soldiers loved them, especially the Henry and Spencer 
rifles, and one soldier of Colonel John T. Wilder’s “Lightning Brigade” commented that, 
with their Spencers, they felt “well night invincible.”5 
  The American Army first used breechloaders in combat a year before the 
Prussians used their Zundnadelgewehre in combat. At the battle of Hoover’s Gap on June 
24, 1863, two regiments of the Wilder Brigade, the Seventeenth Indiana and Ninety-
eighth Illinois stopped a Confederate brigade with withering fire from their Spencer 
repeating rifles.6 These were magazine-fed repeating rifles, but overall the effect was the 
same: troops who could fire faster could do more damage to an enemy. In effect, a 
breechloader or a magazine rifle was a force multiplier. 
  As in Europe, there was much debate over wasting ammunition. Historian 
Geoffrey Wawro commented that Prussian infantrymen would “blaze away recklessly” 
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with their needle-guns, with an accuracy of 1 out of 250 rounds striking a French soldier.7 
While scared Prussian troops may have fired more than their Austrian counterparts, their 
accuracy was no worse than American troops with Springfield rifle muskets in the Civil 
War, who inflicted as many hits at the Battle of Stones River in December 1862.8 
Accuracy of firearms and the training given to soldiers were the causes of poor accuracy, 
not rapidity of fire. Alternatively, the Springfield might have been an excellent rifle 
musket at a time when the head of the United States Patent Office in 1864 declared that 
the needle-gun, the weapon that had yet to cause Austria and Denmark to surrender and 
which would face a tougher opponent in the Franco-Prussian War was “the most 
imperfect of all breechloaders.”9 
  W. C. Dodge, of the United States Patent Office, wrote in 1864 pleading for the 
Union army to adopt breechloaders as standard issue. His critique is a valuable 
commentary on early breechloaders, but also demonstrates that while the United States 
fought a bitter and bloody Civil War, it still kept abreast of European military 
developments and sought to incorporate those into the army. Dodge argued that rather 
than getting excited and wasting ammunition, as Wawro claimed Prussian infantry did, 
by 1864 no American regiment armed with breechloaders had reported instances of 
soldiers firing so fast as to waste ammunition – at least no more often than did soldiers 
armed with muskets.10 Dodge argued that rather than causing soldiers to waste 
ammunition, they had a weapon that could fire faster than a musket made them less prone 
to panic, and thus conserve ammunition. He asserted that opponents armed with a 
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muzzleloader, knowing their enemy to possess a more rapid-fire weapon, would in fact 
panic and be the ones to expend ammunition frivolously.11 
  As a trooper’s state of being prone to excitement was at the forefront of military 
concern during this time, Dodge carefully pointed out that soldiers armed with muskets 
were the victims of panic and excitement. He argued that it was difficult to jam a repeater 
in a frenzied rush, but it was incredibly common for soldiers to load muskets improperly. 
Often soldiers accidentally rammed the minie ball or the round ball down before the 
powder, effectively putting the musket out of combat until cleared. Nervous hands 
dropped priming caps, rendering the musket unable to fire, and some nervous soldiers 
even loaded multiple rounds into the weapon, unable to fire any of them.12 At the Battle 
of Gettysburg, some recovered muskets had ten rounds loaded into the barrel. 
Presumably, these extremes represented weapons picked up and loaded by multiple 
soldiers during the fighting.13 With a breechloader, soldiers could still jam weapons, but 
not as easily as a muzzleloader. Breechloaders offered the American soldier the ability to 
fire faster, have more faith in his weapon, and have a rifle that was safer and not a danger 
to him or his comrades. 
  By the end of the Civil War, the United States Army found the breech-loading 
rifle to be superior to the muzzle-loader in every respect. They had longer ranges, fired 
faster, and had superior penetration and stopping power. Stephen V. Benét, a Captain of 
the Ordnance Department and later commander of the Ordnance Department for much of 
the period after the Civil War, argued for breech-loading rifles during the Civil War, 
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stating that they were superior to the trusted and reliable Springfield musket.14 The war 
had not ended, yet those in control of arms procurement in the United States Army had 
decided on a breechloader, over two years before the majority of European armies came 
to a similar conclusion. 
  The United States Army expressed more than a passing interest in breech-loading 
weapons. Between 1861 and June 1866, the army procured about 396,856 breech-loading 
or repeating rifles, including 3,520 of the old Hall breech-loading rifles, adopted by the 
army experimentally in 1819.15 While the Prussian army was the first force to issue 
breechloaders as standard issue, the acquisition of so many breech-loading rifles by the 
American army indicated that the army was not conservative. In fact, the United States 
military expressed interest in, and procured and issued such rifles well before the British 
did so in haste following the Danish War of 1864. The United States Cavalry received 
most of these rifles and carbines, but their performance was so satisfactory that the 
Ordnance Department recommended in 1872 “so far as our limited experience goes, it 
indicates the advisability of extending this armament to our infantry also.”16 The army 
desired an excellent breechloader and did not want to settle for something that would not 
do the job, but also admitted that a system that could convert the thousands of muskets 
produced during the war was “very desirable.”17 The decision to adopt a system that was 
adaptable to the Springfield rifle muskets placed a handicap on the arms board, but it also 
demonstrates that, in 1864, concurrently with the Britain’s decision to rearm, the United 
States Ordnance Department made a similar conclusion, two years before Austria and 
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France. 
  Historians often describe the adoption of such a weapon as conservative, 
supposedly because it restricted the Ordnance Department’s ability to choose the best 
breech-loading system available. Certainly, budgetary concerns forced such decisions, 
but after building so many rifle muskets over the course of five years of war, using any 
part of them made economic sense. In addition, during the years between the end of the 
Civil War and the close of the Franco-Prussian War, armies adopted several variations of 
breech-loading rifles in an attempt to discover the best type.18 If the Ordnance 
Department spent much of its precious funds on a new breechloader, only to adopt a 
completely different model soon after, the new weapons would create ammunition supply 
nightmares.19 To adopt a stopgap rifle as an interim was common sense. 
  The adoption of a mere conversion to the venerable rifle musket was not a 
foregone conclusion. The Ordnance Department suggested that such a system was 
preferable, but by no means limited itself to only those systems designed to convert 
muskets easily. In January 1865, the United States Army began tests to select a breech-
loading rifle design. At the first ordnance tests that month, the army examined sixty-five 
different types of breech-loading rifles, including ones in service during the Civil War.20 
This board did not agree on any one type of arm, and adjourned for the next year. The 
army hoped that in adopting a new rifle, it would select the best available.21 
  The Ordnance Department did not make a decision about firearm adoption in 
1865, but the national armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, began work anyway. Erskine 
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S. Allin, master armorer, developed a mechanism for loading metallic cartridges into the 
breech of a converted rifle musket. The armorers chose the Model 1861 rifle musket for 
conversion. The national armory made some five thousand of these conversions, and 
issued them to troops in the Washington, D.C. area, but the weapon did not see any Civil 
War combat, as most entered service late in the year and in early 1866.22 
  The Allin conversion is perhaps the most well known of the prototype 
breechloaders produced at Springfield armory, but it was, in fact, not the first. Early in 
1865, before the Civil War ended, the national armory fabricated 3,007 Springfield-
Joslyn rifles. These were not conversions of Springfield Rifle muskets, but a .50-caliber 
rimfire design that used most of the components of the Model 1864 rifle musket, 
including the stock, bands, barrel, and lock. This weapon was a failure and the Arms 
Board of 1865 declined to give it their consideration. In 1871, at a cost of thirty-five cents 
each, the armory modified them to accept the .50-70 caliber centerfire cartridge for 
export.23 The army wanted a breechloader, but was not complacent enough to accept 
whatever design the national armory created. The Union Army had employed rifles of the 
Joslyn system during the Civil War, accumulating over eleven thousand of them before 
the national armory manufactured some.24  The Joslyn represented a counterpart to bolt-
action rifles, such as the Needle Gun, and trapdoor-style rifles, such as the Allin system, 
but the 1865 Board did not see it as competitive with those designs.25 
  The national armory only made a few of the Springfield-Joslyn rifles and until 
1868 primarily converted older rifles to breech-loading designs or to the use metallic 
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casings. General Alexander B. Dyer, Chief of the Ordnance Department from 1864-1874, 
presided over this period of modernization.26 He preferred to act slowly in this critical 
phase, not wanting to adopt something that would be a detriment to the army, or a waste 
of money, as inventors patented new rifles every year.27 Dyer authorized Allin’s 
conversion, claiming in his 1865 report to the Secretary of War that in his view, it 
“appears superior to any other that I have seen.”28 The Chief of Ordnance liked the 
trapdoor conversion, but was not about to force it on the army without testing, or without 
examining other designs. 
  These musket conversions were basic, and with many competing designs, the 
American Army was not satisfied with whatever the national army happened to turn out. 
Numerous defects in the original “First Allin” system caused the army to desire 
something better, and the army was critical of the design and stopped production after 
issuing five thousand rifles. The action was poor, the parts fragile, and the original .58-
caliber cartridge weak and insufficient. Springfield Armory set on to do better.29 
  Erskine S. Allin, designer of the national armory’s submission for breech-loading 
rifles, knew exactly how his rifle stood up to European competitors. A magazine article 
from August 1865 noted that the War Department dispatched Allin to Europe to examine 
the breech-loading designs of Switzerland, Britain, and France.30 While records are 
scarce on his opinions, Allin’s trip demonstrates that the Ordnance Department expressed 
interest in foreign designs, and was able to compare the Springfield to weapons produced 
abroad. 
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  On March 10, 1866, a new board under General Winfield Scott Hancock met in 
Washington, D.C. to reconsider the question of new rifles and carbines, to allow 
designers to adjust their submissions, and to incorporate the lessons of breechloaders 
learned during the past year. The officers convening were General Hancock, Colonel T. 
V. Hagner of the Ordnance Department, Colonel J. G. Benton of the Ordnance 
Department, Lieutenant Colonel Horace Porter, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Owens of 
the Fifth United States Cavalry.31 The arms board had three objectives to consider with 
breech-loading arms. First, it had to determine what type of arm was best suited for the 
infantry. Second, it had to examine what type was better for the cavalry. Finally, the 
board had to consider what system was suited for converting the large stockpile of arms 
owned by the United States government at the close of the Civil War.32 In the hopes of 
attracting the widest range of inventors, and thus not simply reevaluate designs in use in 
Europe, or those used in the Civil War, the government ran columns in the New York 
Times.33 This arms board, like those that followed until the adoption of the Krag-
Jorgensen rifle in 1892, was a serious affair, one that honestly attempted to procure the 
best weapons for the United States Army 
  That the officers of the army asked the board these three questions is significant. 
It demonstrates that the United States Army, as early as 1866, wanted arms best suited to 
individual branches of the army. The board had to decide if an infantry arm’s breech 
system was useful for cavalry, or if a completely new breechloader was conservative. 
Instead of adopting patterns of rifles already in existence, the board extensively tested 
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new patterns and requested foreign and civilian participation. 
  Government arsenals had large stockpiles of muskets, and the board decided to 
begin conversions of those arms while the army and other boards studied new types of 
breech-loading arms. As new developments occurred often in this period, the Hancock 
Board did not want to recommend adoption of a completely new system hastily. The 
board also suggested that future army rifles and carbines be .45-caliber, and demonstrated 
a further lack of conservatism by declaring that cavalry units should be equipped with 
magazine carbines. Magazine weapons were under a period of change and continual 
improvement as well, and the members of the board suggested that the army wait until a 
perfect system existed. In the interim, the officers suggested that the army issue Civil-
War era Spencer magazine carbines to cavalry troopers, demonstrating that at this time, 
the army embraced magazine weapons and did not cling to single-loading designs.34 
  General Dyer, the Chief of Ordnance, agreed with most of the board’s 
recommendations. He argued that a .45-caliber round, as of 1866, showed no better 
performance over the .50-caliber round, which arsenals had already fabricated large 
amounts. To that end, he had day-and-night shifts working at Springfield Armory 
converting muskets to the 1865 pattern Allin system. Dyer wanted to try these arms, a 
decision that General Ulysses S. Grant did not share and did not endorse.35 
  This committee also had no definite result, as the Secretary of War did not 
endorse a single rifle. The board suggested that the national armory produce both new-
pattern and conversion weapons of eight different rifle systems, in the hope that one of 
them might be selected. If anything, the army was indecisive, not conservative, as it 
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wanted a breechloader, and attempted to standardize on one. The Allin rifles made by the 
national armory were an interim solution, and the army was not complacent enough to 
accept that design in its present form.36 
  In 1866, Allin redesigned the Springfield rifle to correct deficiencies in the 
previous design. The Model 1866 had a stronger action, and was of a smaller .50-caliber 
as the older caliber was too large to suit army needs.37 This new weapon did not satisfy 
army requirements completely either, but in an attempt to supply the army with some 
kind of breechloader while the rifle boards deliberated, the national armory fabricated 
approximately fifty thousand of them. Unlike the previous musket conversion, the Model 
1866 utilized the newer Model 1863 rifle musket, instead of the older Model 1861.38 
  In April 1866, while the Hancock Arms Board convened, Prussia, Austria, Italy, 
and many of the smaller German states began mobilizing for war in the conflict known as 
the Austro-Prussian War or Seven Weeks’ War.39 As previously demonstrated, this 
conflict had a profound effect on European firearms technology, causing a quick adoption 
of breech-loading rifles and demonstrating the power of the Prussian needle-gun. Europe 
was enamored with the German firearm, and only after the Franco-Prussian war did 
continental armies begin to view the weapon in a more critical light. 
  On August 2, 1867, troops of Company C, Twenty-Seventh United States Infantry 
used this new rifle, the Model 1866 Springfield, also known as the “Second Allin 
Conversion,” at what was later known as the Wagon Box Fight against Native Americans 
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under Red Cloud.40 These weapons represented a massive improvement in infantry 
firepower, as thirty-two men held off a large force of Native Americans.41 The previous 
year, Indians massacred the troops of Captain William Fetterman’s small command, 
numbering two officers and thirty enlisted men, killing all of the small detachment.42 
These infantrymen still carried the .58-caliber Springfield rifle musket, as did most of the 
infantry at Fort Phil Kearny. In July 1867, an army supply train delivered seven hundred 
of the new Model 1866 Springfield breechloaders to the fort, and these weapons enabled 
the men at the Wagon Box Fight to defend their position successfully.43 
  Many of the infantry received limited or no training in the use of the 
breechloader, but the Allin system proved easy to learn. Private Frederick Claus reported 
that he and the rest of his company had received the Model 1866 Springfield only two 
weeks before using them in combat, hardly time to become fully acquainted with the 
weapon.44 Even without much practice of the weapon, the troops were able to use it 
effectively. At a range of seven hundred yards, the range which the British Army later in 
1872 considered the farthest distance of reasonable accuracy, one soldier only barely 
missed a warrior, and his round ricocheted into the brave’s mount, throwing him off the 
horse.45 
  The soldiers at the Wagon Box Fight loved their Allin Springfields, and such 
optimism made an impression on the army. Samuel Gibson of the Twenty-Seventh 
Infantry recalled being “tickled” about receiving the .50-caliber Model 1866 Second-
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Allin rifles, as he had previously used a muzzle-loading Springfield musket.46 His 
weapon performed wonderfully, though through the lengthy engagement many of the 
men fired so rapidly that the heat from the gun barrels burned their hands, and they “were 
obliged to open the breech-blocks during… [a] lull to allow the barrels to cool off.”47 At 
close range, the accuracy of the weapon and the rapidity of fire possible, even when 
unfamiliar with the Allin “trapdoor” style breech-block system, were such that, according 
to Gibson “we had a steady rest for our rifles… and we simply mowed them down by 
scores.”48 Gibson fondly remembered the weapon that had saved his life. He argued that 
the Indians expected them to carry the old rifle musket, as had the troops under Colonel 
Fetterman. “But thanks to God and Lieutenant General Sherman,” he recalled, “we had 
just been armed with the new weapon.… We simply threw open the breech-blocks of our 
new rifles to eject the empty,[sic] shell and slapped in fresh ones.”49 The early 
Springfield Allin system was successful in combat, performed adequately and soldiers 
liked the weapon.50  
  The Springfield, in combat, demonstrated the qualities that make an excellent 
battle rifle: reliability, ease of use, accuracy, and rapidity of fire. Frederic Claus noted 
that they did not receive training with breechloaders before the fight, but that did not stop 
the men of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry from using them to good effect.51 It was this 
excellent service of the Model 1866 Second-Allin rifle caused Dyer to support the Allin 
system wholeheartedly. It was not because it was the in-house design; it was because of 
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the rifles issued to the troops this weapon received praise during actual combat. 
  The army continued to rearm with breechloaders, but always saw the Allin-system 
in its present state as an interim solution. Work on the converted Springfields moved 
rapidly, and the armory finish the fifty thousand Model 1866s by August 1867, 
modifying 23,083 that year alone.52 The machinery at the armory was sufficient that, with 
the day and night shifts, workers converted four hundred muskets a day to the breech-
loading system.53 Dyer acted slowly, as he did not want to erect facilities to mass-produce 
a weapon that the army might not adopt; in comparison, facilities at Enfield Lock in 
Great Britain converted an average of eleven hundred Enfield rifle muskets daily to the 
Snider system.54 While the army, including both troops and the Springfield’s biggest 
proponent, Dyer, liked the Springfield, the language in the Secretary of War’s report in 
1867 illustrates that the army knew the limitations of the weapon.55 General Dyer 
reported, “It is confidently believed that no musket has been converted into a 
breechloader in this country, or in Europe, which is superior for military purposes to that 
which has been produced at Springfield armory, and none equal to it in serviceable 
qualities can be produced at less cost.”56 
   The language of Dyer’s Ordnance Report shows that the Springfield’s merits were 
its service qualities and cost, and its superiority to other converted breechloaders. Dyer 
acknowledged that the Springfield was better than other converted rifles such as the 
British Snider, the Austrian Wanzl, or the other conversions that European armies 
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undertook in the wake of the Austro-Prussian War. Dyer, at least, reporting to the 
Secretary of War, was not prepared to state that the Allin-Springfield was superior to a 
breechloader that was not a conversion, the main one then in existence being the Dreyse 
Zundnadelgewehr of Prussia. Some observers considered the Springfield superior, among 
them the author of The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of 
the Year 1866, which discussed both the Austro-Prussian War and the 1866 Hancock 
Arms Board. He argued that the Springfield was “much better in all respects than the 
much-vaunted Prussian needle-gun.”57 The Springfield was quickly becoming a 
successful weapon, but even General Dyer argued that a new breech-loading rifle 
probably possessed better qualities. 
  The early Allin rifle was functional, but not representative of a finalized piece 
ready for acceptance on a large scale. Dyer, the main proponent of the system, 
acknowledged that the system was not perfect and needed improvement. Although the 
arm needed work, he noted that those issued, nearly all of them, to the Departments of the 
Missouri and the Platte gave excellent service and proved both accurate and reliable.58 
Springfield armory filled the order for the 1866 Allin rifles, and incorporated changes 
into a new model, the 1868, which Dyer wanted to begin producing the next year.59 
  The primary advantages the mass issue of the Model 1866 Second Allin 
conversion rifles gave to the United States Army were experience with a breechloader 
and the adoption of a standardized cartridge. The fifty thousand rifles issued to army 
troops saw excellent service, as best epitomized by the Wagon Box Fight, and allowed 
the national armory a chance to make combat-tested improvements in its design, 
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something many other firearms submitted to the 1866 Arms Board did not possess.60 The 
primary ammunition facility at Frankford Arsenal had machinery capable of fabricating 
fifty-thousand cartridges daily, and in the Fiscal Year ending in June 1867 made seven 
million .50-caliber center-fire cartridges. Of those, workers at Springfield Armory and 
troops fired 367,943 rounds, with only 1,317 not detonating. Such performance indicated 
that the government ammunition had a failure rate of one-third of 1 percent.61 The effect 
of having a standardized cartridge meant that the army could now create specifications 
for new breechloaders to test, and gauge their qualities with a common ammunition type 
acting as a control test. 
  The year after the Austro-Prussian War, in 1867, the United States sent a group of 
commissioners to the Paris Universal Exposition. Among all of the various exhibits, 
which included examples of cereals, foodstuffs, medicine, and musical instruments, was a 
demonstration of the latest weapons from all over the world. Lieutenant Colonel Charles 
B. Norton and Commissioner William J. Valentine were the American delegates to the 
munitions of war exhibition, and reported both the latest European developments and 
how American weapons compared. The commissioners, referencing a British report, 
noted that the British Boxer cartridge, used in the Snider-Enfield, Britain’s contemporary 
of the Allin rifle, was a “very faulty cartridge.”62 The commissioners also reported that a 
Snider using a Boxer cartridge exploded at the breech, breaking the shooter’s nose, 
because of a faulty cartridge.63 As previously demonstrated, the British eventually 
accepted the Snider as a decent weapon, but initially it was prone to failure. While such 
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an occurrence might not have been unheard of with an American-made Springfield, 
General Dyer argued that most failures with Springfields were due to carelessness and the 
ammunition was comparatively safe, with a low failure rate.64 Of the breech-loading 
cartridges examined in Paris, including French, Prussian, and British, a British observer 
described the American cartridge, though he did not indicate whether referred to the .58- 
or .50-caliber cartridge, as having “first place among the many cartridges that have come 
under our observation.”65 
  The American commissioners commented on many of the various types of arms at 
the exhibit, including the famed needle-gun. The Prussian weapon did not impress Norton 
and Valentine. They argued the weapon was delicate and prone to failure; the paper 
cartridges needed careful transportation and allowed escape of gas at the breech, and even 
argued that the breech-loading rifle itself might not have been quite as decisive against 
Austria in 1866 as military theorists originally claimed.66 The needle-gun was also victim 
to the elements, as the commissioners noted that it was prone to rust, dust, saltwater, 
elements which a then Captain Alexander B. Dyer noted could not put a Spencer or a 
Remington rifle out of action.67 In describing the Snider rifle, the commissioners placed 
any faults of the rifle on the cartridge, which they described as unsafe, as the breech-
action of the weapon was similar in many respects to those in the United States such as 
the Allin-system, which, as Dyer argued, possessed excellent safety records. Norton and 
Valentine contended that any ill repute of the rifle was because “the gun…. has been 
                                                          
64
 United States Congress, Report of the Secretary of War Part I, 1867, 609-610. 
65
 Norton and Valentine, “Report on the Munitions of War,” 14. 
66
 Ibid., 19. 
67
 Ibid., 20. 
58 
 
made to bear the sins of the cartridge.”68 The Snider rifle was a decent breechloader, but 
the original ammunition faulty.  Eventually, starting in 1870, the British adopted the 
Snider-Enfield Mark III, which embodied a new catch on the receiver, to prevent it from 
blowing open should a cartridge fail.69 The Springfields in the hands of United States 
infantry and the ammunition it used were comparatively better than the systems then in 
use in Europe. 
  All of the major militaries during the critical years between the Danish War and 
the Franco-Prussian War examined, scrutinized, and criticized their breech-loading 
designs. Britain, according to the United States commissioners at the Paris exposition, 
adopted the Snider merely out of convenience and adaptability to the Enfield musket, not 
because of its serviceable qualities. The French Chassepot was, at least in 1867, an 
excellent weapon, while the Prussian Zundnadelgewehr began to show its age. The 
Russians adopted the Berdan Rifle, an American invention described as clumsy by the 
United States Army.70  Other nations adopted breechloaders of varying quality, most of 
which the larger powers gave scarce attention to. Much of the problem, pointed out by 
Norton and Valentine, revolved around manufacturing standardized cartridges that were 
both safe and reliable.71  
  Although the Allin rifle was far from perfect, not standard issue, and in a process 
of constant upgrade, it was an excellent, serviceable, and safe rifle and the .50-caliber 
cartridge was superior to ammunition used in Europe. The United States Army in 1867 
was handicapped not because of conservatism, but because its entire regular army was 
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not yet equipped with the breechloader, of which the army already had one equal to those 
in Europe. Regular officers were fond of American-made weapons, but they were not 
alone. “We may venture to say that our countrymen,” wrote Norton and Valentine at the 
conclusion of their report, “have little to learn, and nothing to fear, from European 
makers in the matter of small-arms.”72 General Philip J. Sheridan echoed a similar 
sentiment in 1870 after observing Prussian actions at Gravelotte and Sedan during the 
Franco-Prussian War, claiming, “There is nothing to be learned here professionally… 
[and] there is much, however, which Europeans could learn from us.”73 Clearly, 
American officers thought that the lessons and equipment of the Civil War taught them 
what they needed to know about warfare. 
  Norton and Valentine’s quote demonstrated the period of transition in the 
American Army during the entire latter-half of the nineteenth century; some officers 
desired to pursue American achievements, tactics, and technologies, while others wanted 
European concepts for the sake of them being European.74 Many in the United States read 
European military journals and tried to apply European military concepts. During the 
period following the Civil War, the United States Army modeled itself as a traditional 
European-style fighting force and sought to learn the lessons of European conflicts.75 
Although the commissioners to Paris argued that the United States had nothing to fear 
from European arms, throughout the rest of this period, rather than blindly adopt 
American made inventions, the United States continued to examine, critique, and where 
                                                          
72
 Ibid., 207. 
73
 Quoted in Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 
2003), 206. 
74
 Arthur L. Wagner, The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study of the Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light of 
the American Civil War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1889), 3-4. 
75
 United States War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance to the Secretary of War For the 
Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1880 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880), 425.  
60 
 
possible incorporate the developments of European militaries. 
   While the Hancock Arms Board deliberated in the United States over a breech-
loading rifle, Austrian and Prussian armies mobilized for war; however, the Austro-
Prussian War caused no major scare or realignment in American military thinking. The 
use of many breechloaders in the Civil War already gave the United States army the 
experience that Europe gained after 1866. Lieutenant Arthur Wagner, writing in 1889 as 
an instructor at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, noted that 
the cartridges fired by the Prussians during the Battle of Koniggratz on July 3, 1866, 
amounted to about one round per man.76 While the Prussians might have shot fast once 
they began the process of schnellfeuer, a constant fast-firing repetition of firing with their 
needle-guns, their entire army either did not engage or did not keep a sustained fire.77 In 
terms of numbers engaged, Lieutenant Wagner compared Koniggratz to the Battle of 
Gettysburg and noted that while the numbers engaged were similar, the Austro-Prussian 
clash produced six-thousand fewer.78  
  In fighting during the Civil War ammunition expenditure varied between battle, 
unit, and side, but Earl Hess noted that among several units at several selected battles 
over the course of the war, some units reported as few as six rounds-per-man fired, and as 
many as eighty.79 Certainly, the Prussian rifle demonstrated the effect of breechloaders in 
combat, but so did the Sharps, Spencers, and various other types used by American 
troops. Further, the Austro-Prussian War and the Battle of Koniggratz did not 
demonstrate for the United States the effects of ammunition supply to the troops or the 
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effect of rapidity of fire, because Union and Confederate infantry with their myriad of 
rifled and smoothbore muskets fired more ammunition. The United States was ahead of 
European powers by employing breech-loading rifles by 1863 and starting the process of 
adopting them in 1865. While it examined the lessons and technologies of Europe, the 
fact that the United States found nothing to change or supplant its own designs does not 
mark the Ordnance Department or the Army as conservative.  
  If there were conservative military powers during the years between 1861 and 
1871, they were the continental European powers. While the United States was keen to 
learn and study European developments and wars, although not to the point of adopting 
things continental because they were foreign, the European nations largely ignored small 
arms lessons of the American Civil War because the Danish and Austrian wars yielded 
many of the same results. To this end, historian Jay Luvaas argues that, despite having 
observers in the American conflict, no aspect of the war penetrated official European 
doctrine. The Prussians did not attempt to use the Civil War to understand how their 
needle-gun might perform in actual combat, and, instead, ignored the use of other types 
of breechloaders to correct any deficiencies. Even Britain, who studied the war, failed to 
appreciate its military lessons until European battlefields in 1866 and 1870 duplicated the 
results.80  
  When compared with European powers, the United States examined European 
technologies and tactics and incorporated those that worked, while Europe examined the 
United States and seemed uninterested in the results. In hindsight, the United States may 
have been slow to adopt certain technologies, such as smokeless powder in 1886 but 
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between 1864 and 1870, the United States Army maintained itself with similar equipment 
to the forces in Europe, in terms of technological and doctrinal improvement, if not 
military size and deployment. 
  While the Allin system represented the in-house design of the national armory, 
the United States Army had not settled on its design. The army continued experimenting 
with weapons, as well as updating those breechloaders that demonstrated their usefulness 
during the Civil War. In 1865, the army retained fifty thousand Sharps rifles and 
carbines, and following the adoption of the .50-70 cartridge used in the Second Allin 
Conversion, the army requested a conversion of the Sharps breechloader to the new 
round. The Sharps Rifle Manufacturing Company did not deliver the prototype 
conversions until 1868, but by 1869, the army received over thirty thousand 
conversions.81 The army so liked the weapons that Springfield Armory converted another 
thousand in 1870, and produced three hundred weapons with completely new receivers 
made by the Sharps Company. While many of the soldiers who fought at the Wagon Box 
Fight liked the Springfield, others in army circles preferred the Sharps system.82  
  While debate continued on the Springfield and the Sharps, still other army 
officials wanted a magazine weapon and preferred the Spencer repeating rifle. Despite 
their lack of replacement parts and having unique parts not shared by other rifles, in 1870 
the United States Army authorized conversion of 1,109 Spencer Model 1865 rifles. The 
converted rifles went unused and the army placed them in storage, preferring the Spencer 
carbine to the rifle.83 Army troops generally liked the Spencer, and while most of the men 
at the Wagon Box Fight carried the Springfield, a small number used these repeaters as 
                                                          
81
 Hosmer, The .58- and .50-caliber Rifles and Carbines of the Springfield Armory, 1865-1872, 173. 
82
 Ibid., 173-174. 
83
 Ibid., 157-158. 
63 
 
well.84 By 1869, the entire United States Cavalry received either Spencers or modified, 
.50-caliber Sharp’s carbines, the former being “regarded as a superior arm by the 
cavalry,” while Springfield Armory finished thirty thousand conversions of the latter, 
which General Dyer considered “decidedly superior” to the Spencer for cavalry use.85 
Clearly, the Ordnance Department did not agree with all of the recommendations of the 
troops. 
  By the end of the 1860s, it was apparent that the army needed to standardize on a 
rifle. Congress ordered no new rifles produced by the national armory until an ordnance 
board selected a single rifle. Rather than have a separate style of carbine for cavalry 
troopers, as was currently done, Congress wanted one type of weapon with a long barrel 
length for the infantry, and a shorter, more manageable one for mounted troops. As a 
result, the army prepared for trials in 1869 to adopt a new rifle, with the hope that this 
board would be more successful than the 1866 Hancock Board. 86 Springfield Armory 
tried to fabricate more Model 1868 rifles before the board convened, and as a result, 
Congress slashed appropriations. The armory needed something to do, but as the Model 
1868 was technically a new rifle, and not a musket conversion, it violated Congress’s 
directive to the army to form an arms board to adopt a new rifle. The government wanted 
a new rifle, but only one recommended by the army. The Allin system saw satisfactory 
service and officials recommended it, but no army board had officially approved the 
weapon.87 
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 The army had not decided on which system of rifle to adopt, but it was not 
conservative because the Ordnance Department continued to experiment with varying 
kinds of rifles, not limited to a single nationality or a single style. The conversions of 
Springfield rifle muskets in the 1860s were purely stopgap measures provided by the 
national armory, an attempt to experiment with breechloaders in the cheapest, and most 
financially secure, way. The conversions of muskets by the national armory were a way 
for the Army to gain more breech-loading weapons, gain experience with them, and give 
Erskine S. Allin a chance to perfect his design’s effectiveness under actual service 
conditions – something that the majority of the designs submitted to the boards in 1865 
and 1866 did not. In addition, the army produced no new rifles during this time for 
general service, converting only muskets as the army wanted to adopt the best system 
available. Of the eight rifles the Hancock Board gave tacit approval to, only two of them, 
the Sharp’s and the Allin-system, had seen combat, making any kind of judgment as to 
which system was “most perfect” difficult at best.88 The army demonstrated slowness and 
indecisiveness in selecting a breech-loading, standard-issue rifle, but seized on the 
concept of a breech-loading rifle and experimented with different designs, while not 
“rubber-stamping” the first prototype system proposed by the national armory, 
demonstrating that with regards to weaponry the American Army was not conservative 
during this period.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE ICON OF CONSERVATISM:  
THE ADOPTION OF THE .45-CALIBER MODEL 1873 SPRINGFIELD, 1869-1875 
 
  For four years beginning in 1865, the United States Army examined various rifles, 
without making a decision. Arms boards identified patterns of arms of interest, but could 
not agree on one type. General Alexander B. Dyer wanted to ensure that whatever system 
the army adopted would be best suited to its military needs, although he showed a 
particular preference for the Allin Springfield rifle. Congress, especially after Dyer’s 
attempts to produce new-production Model 1868 Springfields, wanted the army to arrive 
at a decision for a single system for both the infantry and the cavalry. On August 6, 1869, 
General William Tecumseh Sherman directed General John M. Schofield to convene a 
board at St. Louis, Missouri, rather than a more-often used eastern location, for the 
purposes of selecting an arms system for issue to the army. General Order Seventy from 
the army charged the board with examining both the arms then in service in the United 
States and those that might be submitted from civilians and if possible adopt an arm that 
suited the purposes of both the army and navy with an eye towards interchangeable parts. 
Not only was the army still, as had been its goal all along, attempting to adopt a suitable 
arm, but rather than conservatively focus on inter-service rivalry the army was desirous
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of the cooperation of the Navy. 1  
  The board was not a radical departure from previous arms tests. General Sherman 
instructed the officers to take various factors of arms construction into account. They 
were to examine based on merits, interchangeability of parts, cost, ease of manufacture, 
the ammunition type, and how many pieces the government already had. Like any good 
military arm, they needed to be easy to repair and cheap to produce, especially in a time 
when the size of the regular army, and the money appropriated to it, were shrinking. 
Amazingly, the army removed restrictions on ammunition, allowing inventors to submit 
arms of any caliber, even ones the army previously determined insufficient, rather than 
mandate the use of the .50-70 cartridge, which Frankford Arsenal was able to produce at 
an amazing rate. The American cartridge was successful in service, even European 
nations admired its abilities, and the army demonstrated a willingness to change it if an 
arms board found a better rifle that used a different round.2 
  The board examined forty-one different rifles of twenty different systems, and 
many of the inventors submitted several rifles, of different calibers, with slight 
improvements, or with different bayonet mounting systems, as well as eight carbines and 
eleven pistols. The officers abused, field stripped, examined, rusted, and subjected the 
weapons to extreme firing tests, generally firing over five hundred rounds before 
cleaning. The most active company present was Remington, who presented eight rifles, 
two carbines, and four pistols to the army board. The Remington plant made the majority 
of the weapons, but the national army also fabricated one rifle, one pistol, and one of the 
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carbines to Remington’s design.3 
  The result of these tests was that the arms board recommended the Remington, 
Springfield, and Sharp’s rifle, in that order, for trial and possible adoption. Three other 
rifles, the Morgenstern, Ward-Burton magazine gun, and Martini-Henry, soon to be 
adopted by the British Army, were selected as better examples than most of those arms 
submitted but did not have the “superior excellence” required for adoption.4 The Martini-
Henry, like the Prussian Zundnadelgewehr, was an example of a European firearm that 
the American Army found did not suit its needs. Even the British were initially skeptical 
of the Martini-Henry rifle, noting that its ammunition was so defective that the copper 
rim-fire cartridges “burst repeatedly near the rim,” thus casting the arm in “a negative 
light.”5 Just because the United States did not adopt them, and because they were 
“European,” did not make the American Army conservative any more than the European 
nations who did not adopt American firearms despite heaving praise upon them. Many of 
the firearms demonstrated to armies during this period showed potential, but potential did 
not translate into effective performance at the time of testing and adoption, when the rifle 
needed to be as close to perfection as possible. 
  General Dyer, always a critic of the Remington and favoring the Springfield, 
openly disagreed with the commission. He pointed to defects in the Remington system, 
particularly its troubles in detonating cartridges, and argued that the Sharps and 
Springfield rifles were the better choice.6 The .50-caliber Remington modified to load at 
half cock, approved as having the most merit by the board, failed to fire eighteen rounds 
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out of five hundred and extracted the majority with difficulty after sustained firing, and as 
the barrel fouled accuracy became horrible.7 Eight cartridges from another Remington 
rifle, with a barrel made at Springfield failed to detonate when the testers fired five 
hundred rounds.8 In both cases, the Remingtons used the .50-caliber service cartridge. By 
comparison, the Springfield, with the same cartridge, had only one round fail to detonate 
and had a comparable rate of fire, and much better accuracy.9 The Remington was only 
superior in rate of fire, and only the rifle made with a Springfield barrel performed so 
well. The Sharps rifle, also favored by Dyer, had similar accuracy but had twelve 
cartridge failings during the test.10 
  The board, in recommending the trials of the Remington, noted that the army had 
to modify any of the weapons for loading at half cock, a complaint Dyer acknowledged 
stemmed from every infantry company using the weapon. The original could only be 
loaded at full cock, meaning that any jar of the weapon or stout rap on the receiver might 
cause it to discharge. He suggested purchasing one thousand rifles of each of the 
Remington, Springfield, and Sharps systems for trials, noting that the national armory not 
only made the Springfield but was in the process of making Remingtons for the Navy, 
and had stocks of Sharps weapons convertible to the .50-caliber cartridge. 11 
  Edward Spon’s Dictionary of Engineering published the entire report of the St. 
Louis Arms Board, as well as accompanying material on breechloaders then in service. 
Beyond the report, the author of the firearms section of the 1871 edition included 
comparisons with the arms presented at the board as well as those then in use in Europe 
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or under consideration for adoption. The author had harsh criticism for the needle-gun, 
which by the close of the French War in 1871 ceased to be the standard that armies 
measured their breechloaders. Specifically, the article criticized the paper cartridge as 
being susceptible to the elements and that the rifle did not have an effective gas seal, 
similar to the ones issued for trials to the United States Army.12 For the Martini-Henry 
rifle, recently adopted by Britain to replace the Snider, the author had harsh comments, 
calling it deficient, costly, and prone to accidents and failures.13 In hindsight, the Martini 
system stayed in British service until the 1890s, well after the adoption of the Pattern 
1888 Magazine Lee Metford, but in 1870, it was fraught with defects that prevented the 
United States Army, which was in no rush to act quickly, from adopting what its generals 
considered a dangerous and unsuitable arm.14 
  The author of the engineering manual was not simply anti-British or against 
small, unknown inventors, but his article demonstrates how requirements varied between 
armies. Historians need to judge the requirements of each army individually before 
making their argument. The work described the Berdan rifle, well liked and recently 
adopted by the Russian Army, as “a clumsy attempt to evade…. patents.”15 He further 
asserted that it was a deficient arm, and an example to inventors on how not to make a 
breech-loading arm; it was representative of the many poor rifles often submitted to arms 
boards at this time.16 Mixed opinions prevailed in Russia on the Model 1868 Berdan I, 
but the Model 1870 Berdan II, adopted in 1869, was a success, described that year by V. 
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Shkliarevich, author of a Russian firearms book, as “an excellent military arm.”17 
Observers in the United States did not like the Berdan Rifle or the Martini-Henry, and yet 
both proved to be serviceable arms in foreign service. The United States’s rejection of 
these pieces is not conservatism. 
  As a response to the 1870 Arms Board, Dyer had rifles and carbines of each 
system fabricated at Springfield Armory for issue to the troops, and pushed for another 
arms board in 1872 to standardize on a system for mass issue, in part because the arsenals 
were short of arms.18 The Schofield Board liked the Remington, but the troops and 
General Dyer liked the Springfield.19 Congress and the army wanted the troops to have a 
new arm, and on June 6, 1872 appropriated $150,000 for the manufacture of rifles at the 
national armory after the adoption of a single system for infantry and cavalry arms.20 
  Three months later, on September 4, 1872, an arms board under General Alfred 
H. Terry convened in Springfield, Massachusetts, to select a breech-loading rifle, and this 
time, unlike the previous boards, the tone of this meeting was to standardize an arm.21 
While the board examined rifles as its most important duty, the board also busily 
occupied itself with investigating a trowel bayonet devised by Lieutenant Edmund Rice. 
The board divided on the usefulness of the implement, but more importantly divided on 
the utility of the bayonet, long a hallmark of modern infantry. Bayonet had long been a 
favored infantry weapon, but General Alfred Terry, President of the Board, wrote in his 
report that, with the breech-loading rifle, “I think the day of the bayonet has passed 
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away.”22 Others like Colonel H. B. Clitz worried that adopting the trowel would “spoil 
the bayonet.”23 The board recommended the implement’s adoption, but the fact that the 
army was considering dispensing with the bayonet, long considered a necessary military 
weapon, demonstrates that within the cost-consciousness of the post-war years, army 
commanders demonstrated a willingness to abandon tradition for new technologies. 
  Like the 1870 arms board, the Terry board subjected weapons to vigorous testing, 
and also tested models then in use in Europe for their suitability for adoption or, more 
appropriately, as examples to measure the new models to. In all, the board examined ten 
European-issue weapons, representing the latest patterns available, as well as those that 
had received much fame in the resent conflicts in Austria and France. The rifles were the 
French Chassepot, the Prussian needle-gun in three incarnations: a rifle, carbine, and 
improved form, the German 1871 Mauser, which replaced them, the Austrian Werndl and 
Wanzl, the Bavarian Werder, the Swiss Vetterli, and the British Martini-Henry and 
Snider-Enfield.24 Before even commenting on a final rifle design, the arms board had at 
least saw of how the various pieces they tested would perform against the weapons then 
in use in Europe. The board took special interest primarily in the Martini and the Werndl 
rifle. Rusting, which the board inflicting on every rifle, disabled the Austrian standard-
issue arm during the tests and the board removed the weapon from further tests.25   
  The board dragged on, testing new arms and directing Springfield Armory to 
fabricate new trials patterns of submitted arms in a new .45-calinber chambering. After 
eight months, General Terry called for a vote among the board, which showed many 
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different opinions. He telegraphed the Adjutant General of the Army, asking if the board 
could select a few rifles for trials and then adoption, much like the previous boards. No 
one in the army wanted to make a decision, for fear of selecting a rifle that would soon be 
outdated.  E. D. Townsend telegraphed back asking the board to select a rifle, as 
Congress dictated that the armory could only produce a new type of rifle, no more trials 
weapons, and no more conversions. He sent, “If it is hard for this board to agree, much 
harder would it be to get a decision from various reports of different officers in the 
field.”26 The army tasked this board with selecting a final rifle design for standard issue. 
  Eventually, the arms board came to a decision. They wanted a magazine gun for 
limited trials, and selected the Ward-Burton for further development. The board further 
went on to express the value of magazine weapons, noting that they were inherently 
better than breechloaders, claiming that when it was a good breechloader and had 
possessed a safe and easily workable magazine, then “every consideration of public 
policy will require its adoption.”27 The Ward-Burton was not completely ready for 
service, so the board selected the Springfield system, loved by the troops, tested in 
combat, and now with a newer, improved cartridge, as the new army rifle, officially 
adopted as the Model 1873 Springfield rifle (see Figures Five, Six, and Twelve).28 The 
army, in May 1873, believed this rifle to be the best suited to its needs and superior to the 
various rifles then in use in Europe. 
  For financial reasons, and to make use of the wealth of surplus parts left over 
from the Civil War, the army initially wanted a system that would allow the conversions 
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of old rifle muskets or at least make use of their parts. While this limitation did limit the 
choices the army pursued in the 1860s, financial concerns and the ability to rearm quickly 
were the prime motivators of that decision. By 1872, they did not dictate which rifle 
system was ultimately adopted. The Remington system, favored by many in the army but 
strongly opposed by General Dyer, was actually cheaper to produce than the Springfield. 
The cost of a Remington, depending upon the royalty charged by E. Remington and Sons, 
was between fourteen and sixteen dollars for the twelve thousand rifles purchased and 
accepted by the navy and the ten thousand additional rifles rejected by that service.29 In 
1877, the Springfield system in its adopted form cost eighteen dollars.30 The Austrian 
Werndl, another converted system, cost even less in 1885, reported at twelve dollars and 
twelve cents, while the Mannlicher repeating rifle cost only a few dollars more, and both 
prices included bayonets.31  Even though Erskine Allin was a government employee, and 
thus might not have required a royalty, the cost without a royalty was still more than the 
Remington.32  
  Despite its origins as a musket conversion, the Springfield rifle did not represent a 
conservative decision on the army’s part. Army officers argued that, based on field trials, 
combat reports, and overwhelming praise, it was the better rifle. Aside from ammunition 
difficulties later encountered by the new .45-caliber cartridge, the new system was 
relatively trouble free. Many of the rifles adopted in this period by various armies were 
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problematic when they first entered service, and thus historians must not apply the 
benefits of hindsight. The weapon was cheap to produce, which undoubtedly was a factor 
in its selection. Cheap does not translate to inefficient or ineffective, though, and it was 
not the prime concern during the arms test. An article in the Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution cited the British Martini-Henry’s cost of 2 pounds, 18 shillings, and 9 
pence to produce, or for the 1870 currency conversion approximately 16.42 United States 
Dollars, actually making it a cheaper alternative to the Springfield.33 As previously seen, 
the United States Army rejected this rifle as unsuitable to its military needs, even though 
it was a cheaper and more cost-effective weapon.34 The army was cost-conscious, but not 
conservative and still desired the best weaponry for its soldiers and did not see cost as a 
primary limiting factor. As opposed to being a simple, cheap, stopgap design, the 
Springfield was actually more expensive than some European and non-government 
American rifle designs, but the Ordnance Department believed it to be the most suitable. 
  Following the death of General Alexander B. Dyer on May 20, 1874, Brigadier 
General Stephen V. Benét became the new Chief of the Ordnance Department of the 
United States War Department.35 Like Dyer, Benét liked the Springfield rifle, but noted 
that in its first year of production, Congress only appropriated one hundred thousand 
dollars for retooling and construction, and slowness in developing the new .45-caliber 
ammunition hampered the production of this new rifle. In his annual report of 1874, he 
pleaded for at least half a million dollars for the immediate rearming of the army. While 
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not attacking the small size of the regular army, he wanted half a million rifles 
manufactured and stored, ready to arm a militia should an emergency develop.36 The 
appropriations did not increase “to any significant amount” for 1875, although the 
national army fabricated enough weapons to equip the regular army by the middle of the 
year, and create a reserve of twenty-six thousand rifles and carbines.37 The Ordnance 
Department was not conservative, only cash-strapped as it begged for more money. For 
1876, Congress only appropriated one hundred thousand dollars for the manufacture of 
new arms, an amount that would not rise until fiscal year 1879, and even then only to two 
hundred thousand dollars, at a time when General Benét requested between nine-hundred 
thousand and one million dollars for small arms.38 
  Many of the rifles during the period of transition after the Franco-Prussian War 
were problematic, including rifles usually exhibited as superior to the Springfield. The 
German Infanterie Gewehr 1871 Mauser, ancestor of the rifle that Germany used in two 
World Wars, suffered from many handicaps when it was adopted, shortcomings that the 
United States Army saw at the Terry Arms Board in 1872-1873. Like the problematic 
British Snider, the German rifle had no ejector, meaning that after firing the soldier had 
to remove the cartridge case manually either with his hands or by tipping the rifle over. 
The bayonet, mounted on the side of the rifle, affected accuracy, as did the bolt’s locking 
mechanism, which caused recoil to be absorbed primarily on the right side of the action, 
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throwing off the rifle’s balance as the bullet left the muzzle. German armorers corrected 
some of these deficiencies, but others, like the bolt problems and the bayonet mounting, 
where endemic to the rifle.39  
  The Springfield suffered from none of these problems, its major drawback being 
the copper case of the .45-70 Government Round. Until 1886, American metallic 
ammunition utilized copper cases, primarily because the means of creating and tempering 
brass cartridges was not available to the United States. The copper appears to have 
worked adequately enough in the .58 and .50-caliber ammunition, as arms tests and 
Frankford Arsenal reported comparatively few failures. Armorers and soldiers fired 
367,943 .50-caliber cartridges during 1867 and only 1,317 failed to explode. This number 
is a failure rate of one-third of 1 percent, although the Secretary of War’s 1867 report 
does not mention if any stuck hard and jammed in rifles or Gatling guns.40 Problems of 
jamming, as the copper expanded and stuck in the breech of the rifle, were endemic to the 
new Model 1873 Springfield and other rifles and carbines that used the new cartridge 
until a bass case replaced it.41 
  The most high-profile failure of the new weapon, and perhaps part of the reason 
that historians have called its adoption “conservative,” was the fight at Little Big Horn on 
June 26, 1876, when a force of Sioux warriors annihilated General George Armstrong 
Custer’s detachment of the Seventh United States Cavalry.42 In an article entitled “The 
Little Big Horn, or Why Custer Lost,” A. F. Wallace argued in 1920 that the single-shot 
weapon they carried was the contributing factor. He argued that the Spencer, a repeater, 
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could have changed the outcome of the battle. The Springfield, he argued in hindsight, 
“was no better than a club after a few shots were fired.” and noted how soldiers used 
pocketknives to pry stuck copper cases out of their jammed carbines.43 The author’s 
argument is significant because it demonstrates the prejudice that colored many writers’ 
view of the weapon, and the army at the time. Wallace used the Wagon Box Fight of 
1867 as evidence of the Spencer’s capabilities, apparently not realizing most of the 
infantry in that action carried 1866 Allin Springfields, which shared much of the design 
of the Model 1873 carbines the Seventh Cavalry used.44 
  Many argue the United States Army was conservative in adopting a single-shot 
rifle because it already possessed a repeater, many Indians used magazine weapons, and, 
just over ten years after the army standardized on a rifle, Europe began to switch to 
repeating rifles. European armies began the shift towards magazine fed rifles after the 
Battle of Plevna in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, when a force of Turks carrying 
American-made Winchester repeaters badly bloodied Russian infantry carrying 
American-designed Berdan rifles.45 For the Germans, the battle demonstrated that “The 
new and complicated small-arms have proven efficient…. nor was there any difficulty 
encountered in the handling of magazine rifles formerly condemned as a weapon of 
war.”46 Even so, while the French navy adopted a magazine rifle in 1878, the European 
armies did not begin to adopt magazine rifles as standard issue, with the exception of 
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Switzerland, until 1884. Two years later, the French adopted the Modèle 1886 Lebel rifle, 
the world’s first smokeless, magazine rifle, which changed military tactics and weaponry 
as much as the Prussian Zundnadelgewehr had twenty years earlier.47 
  In 1872, when General Alfred Terry and the rest of the arms board that convened 
in Massachusetts proclaimed that the Springfield rifle best suited army needs, the weapon 
did. Besides Switzerland, no European nation carried magazine rifles as standard issue, 
though some like Turkey and the United States used them to a limited extent. While the 
Hancock Board of 1866 liked the Spencer repeating rifle, it used a small cartridge 
unsuitable for infantry, which is why they recommended it for adoption by the cavalry.48 
As Congress wanted a single type of system, the Spencer rifle was unsuitable. The 
mechanism of the Winchester, when rusted, was unworkable, thus making it also 
unsuited as a military arm.49 Though many companies produced repeating rifles in the 
United States, none was suitable as a military arm for both the infantry and cavalry, and 
arms boards usually rejected them. Even the Winchesters used by the Turks were not 
standard issue, as most Turkish soldiers, especially infantry, carried the American-made 
Peabody-Martini rifle, a single-shot rifle rejected by the United States Army.50  
  Major John C. Davis, in a master’s thesis written in 2007, argued that the army’s 
adoption of the Model 1873 Springfield represented “poor decision-making” and that 
because the army had experience with repeaters in the Civil War, adopting the new rifle 
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“seemed like a step backwards.”51 Davis expressed a desire to compare American arms 
with those of Europe, but never does, limiting such comparisons with his discussions of 
modern firearms in an attempt to link Ordnance Department procedures of the nineteenth 
century with those of the twentieth.52 Such comparisons are harsh and do not represent 
the situation adequately as it existed in 1873. Adopting a breech-loading rifle with 
musket origins that still looks suspiciously like a muzzle-loading weapon may appear 
conservative when one considers that bolt-action rifles and repeaters became the standard 
military arm until the Korean War. In 1872, they were still in their infancy, with defects 
that a more conventional design avoided. The Spencer rifle, while adequate as a cavalry 
arm, was inferior as an infantry arm because of its underpowered cartridge that lacked 
range and stopping power, a problem that affected the Winchester rifle as well.53 The 
army liked the idea of magazine carbines for its horse soldiers, but in a day when infantry 
still traded volleys and fought in line, an underpowered magazine rifle had little 
usefulness. The abandonment of the magazine rifle did not represent conservative 
thinking, as only the Swiss army and their Vetterli rifle possessed a magazine. In this 
regard, the United States was no more conservative than any of the other major armies 
during the breechloader era. Certainly, the Indians possessed magazine arms, but Europe, 
mostly, did not.54  
  The Terry arms board compared the Springfield, the Remington, the Sharps, and 
the Spencer rifles alongside the arms then in use in Europe. That was the test: not which 
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weapon held the most potential for twenty years in the future, or which laid claim to 
being the best repeater. The task was to choose the rifle best suited to the military needs 
of the United States, as an army rifle, in 1873. Among all of the rifles presented, some 
shoddy, some repeaters, and some general issue in armies with more recent ‘traditional’ 
combat experience than the United States, the army considered the Springfield the best. 
Granted, the only time infantrymen used the Springfield against a European nation it was 
outclassed, and the men of the Second Massachusetts Infantry carrying them in 1898 had 
to come out of the line at El Caney in Cuba.55 This failure twenty-five years later does not 
mean the adoption of the rifle was a bad decision, as that battle was against an enemy 
using smokeless, repeating rifles. By 1898, the Chassepot, the 1871 Mauser, the Martini-
Henry, the Vetterli, the Berdan, the Wanzl, the Werndl, and the Werder, all of the 
contemporaries of the Springfield, had been relegated to second-line duties or discarded 
from service.56  
  Of all of the rifles adopted in the late 1860s and early 1870s, only the Springfield 
saw combat against a European power some quarter-century after its adoption while 
infantry still fought in lines. The fact that the weapon failed then should not be 
misconstrued as it being a poor weapon to begin with, only that the adoption of 
magazines and smokeless powder had overtaken it, as those developments had overtaken 
all of its contemporaries. When Russia and Germany used their Berdans and 1871 
Mausers as second-line rifles during the First World War, they performed as badly as had 
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the Springfield in 1898.57 They were not bad rifles, only overtaken by new technologies 
and the passage of time. 
  The United States produced firearms for various nations, of various types, and of 
various calibers, while not adopting any of them for indigenous service. Denmark, 
Sweden, Spain, Egypt, and even the Papal States all employed the Remington rifle, long 
championed as defective by General Alexander B. Dyer.58 Indeed, Austria almost 
adopted the weapon before the same pressures of patriotism and resentment of foreign 
innovation that prevented the adoption of the needle-gun caused the selection of the 
Wanzl. Switzerland even chose the Vetterli not because it wanted a magazine rifle, but 
because Remington was unable to take on another large order after delivering fifteen 
thousand rifles.59 The United States Army understood how prevalent other American-
made rifles were with all of these acceptances, and the arms boards understood the trends 
of European rifle design. Against all of those things, they believed the Springfield was 
the superior weapon. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
AS EFFECTIVE AS FORTY SPRINGFIELDS:  
MACHINE-GUNS AND MAGAZINE RIFLES, 1865-1878 
 
  Although the Gatling gun found much favor in the United States, and French 
mitrailleuses generated much interest in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, there was 
still a global debate as to how to employ the weapons effectively.  Rather than 
demonstrating conservatism, as many authors charge, the United States Army and the 
Ordnance Department during the Civil War actually embraced these new technologies 
and weapons well before their European contemporaries; although like European armies 
failed to create workable tactical doctrines for the weapons. The American army still did 
not understand exactly how to employ the weapons, and the Ordnance Department 
classed them as artillery, but the army wanted to keep its Gatling Guns. In a panic in the 
wake of the war some nations, like Russia, ordered numerous machine-guns to give their 
armies a firepower advantage on the battlefield. Officers in other armies condemned the 
mass acquisition of these weapons, arguing that the war had not demonstrated their 
usefulness, and only the French, the losing side in the conflict, employed the weapons. 
While Europe continued to have mixed interests on the adoption and use of machine-
guns, the United States Army clung to its weapons, and attempted to find appropriate
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tactical uses for the weapons. 1  
  The United States Army after the Franco-Prussian War fully embraced the new 
quick-firing weapons. In 1872, Norton declared, “The artillery branch of no army is 
complete without the “Gatling Gun,”” and in his book on American small arms gave his 
full support to the weapons.2 In contrast, a British observer adopted a more conservative 
stance and, referring to the Russians mass order of the weapons after the Prussian victory, 
Lieutenant Charles Vincent of the British Twenty-third Royal Welsh Fusilier Regiment 
commented, “now that calmer moments have succeeded to the startling events of that 
year, the suitability of mitrailleuses for the field is being seriously considered.”3 The 
United States saw the potential of the weapons well before European armies, and the 
events of the French conflict caused doubt about the machine-gun’s effectiveness in 
British circles. 
  Always willing to make a profit or motivated by patriotism during wartime, 
inventors offered nine types of machineguns to the War Department, who liked some of 
the weapons but was unwilling to commit to unproven technology during the crisis.4 On 
August 24, 1866, as the army sought to rearm with new breech-loading rifles, it 
expressed interest in new Gatling Guns and purchased one hundred of the weapons, fifty 
each of 1-inch and .50-caliber versions, at a total cost of $175,000.5 The army had 
selected a cartridge, the .50-caliber, but in 1866 still had not decided on a standard type 
of breech-loading rifle, and later, in 1872, Congress only appropriated $150,000 for the 
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manufacture of new, unconverted  rifles for when the army finally decided on which one 
it wanted.6 The “conservative, cost-conscious” Ordnance Department, to use Armstrong’s 
own words, spent more money on new, untried machine-guns in 1866 than it did on new 
rifles, that it needed much worse, in 1873.7 Further, the army’s purchase of the new 
weapons, delivered in 1867, was at a time when “No European power had evinced more 
than a passing interest in machine guns.”8 
  The Gatling gun was an excellent weapon for its time, being simple, reliable, and 
best of all, lightweight and mobile.9 Of the one hundred weapons purchased for trial, the 
Ordnance Department issued twenty-three to regular troops in 1868 and 1869, and 
another seventeen in 1871 and 1872. The issuances of the weapon took place slowly, but 
especially in the 1860s, the army tested the weapons extensively.10 
  The reliability of the weapon was excellent, even in the original versions and the 
.58-caliber version tried before the army contracted for one-hundred pieces. One of the 
barrels burst on a .58-caliber piece in 1865, but caused no damage to the operators and 
the weapons remaining barrels continued to function, and Lieutenant I.W. Maclay of the 
First United States Artillery noted that even when partially disabled “the gun is still 
efficient.”11 A test of a 1inch-caliber piece in March, 1866, revealed that of 432 rounds 
fired only 4 rounds misfired, a failure rate of  1.1 percent, which while four times higher 
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than that of the .50-caliber service cartridge, was not horrible considering that the 1inch-
caliber projectile was not yet standard issue and the weapon had yet to be perfected.12 
Lieutenant Colonel T. G. Baylor of the Fortress Monroe Arsenal, on July 14, 1866, wrote 
that the Gatling gun of 1-inch caliber was “a superior arm to 24-pounder howitzer for 
flank defense as from 80 to 100 buck-and-ball cartridges can be fired in 1 minute and 30 
seconds, being a discharge of 1,200 to 1,600 projectiles.”13 Six weeks after Baylor’s 
glowing report, the army ordered one hundred of the new weapons. 
  The 1874 Ordnance Memoranda 17 details American and British army 
experiments with Gatling Guns as infantry-supporting artillery and as pieces for the flank 
defense of fortifications. An American arms board tested its effectiveness against targets 
simulating infantry and cavalry, and compared the Gatling with the .45-caliber 
Springfield while a British board, in October 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War, 
tested it against the Montigny mitrailleuse and the Martini-Henry and Snider rifles. At 
ranges of 600 and 800 yards, where both the Montigny and Gatling fired 720 and 550 
rounds of ammunition respectively, the American-designed Gatling was more accurate, 
scoring 618 and 439 hits, respectively, compared with 538 and 292. In addition, the rate 
of fire of the Gatling gun was quicker, taking 5 minutes and 51 seconds to fire the 1,270 
rounds, while the French weapon took 7 minutes and 8 seconds to do the same. 14 The 
French used the Montigny alongside the Reffye mitrailleuse in 1870, and Prussian 
soldiers called the machine-gun “Höllenmaschine, the hell machine.”15 For all the terror 
of the French mitrailleuse and the rush to procure similar weapons that it caused all over 
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Europe, the American-designed weapon was superior. 
  In the summer of 1873, an arms board, presided by Major Q. A. Gillmore, 
convened in Washington to decide on the utility of Gatling Guns for the flank defense of 
fortifications. This board had access to all of the test records of previous boards and 
experiments with the Gatling gun by the United States Army, and even possessed detailed 
accounts of the British tests in 1870 when examiners paired the weapon against its French 
counterpart.16 At another board, examiners fired a Gatling gun for four hours, expending 
63,000 rounds of ammunition without stopping to service or clean the weapon. At the 
close of the test, Lieutenant Commander J. D. Marvin of the United States Navy, 
supervisor of the test, proclaimed the .50-caliber Gatling gun “eminently satisfactory.”17  
  The board wrestled with the problems of how best to employ the Gatling gun, at 
what ranges, and what calibers and types of shot to use.  They found that one well-served 
Gatling delivered approximately the same number of rounds on target as forty men issued 
with .45-caliber Springfield rifles, and at ranges of up to 200 yards, the Gatling was more 
accurate than the rifles. Despite great accuracy, the board noted that the rifle “covered the 
targets better” and “would have been more effective against a deep column of troops.”18 
As early as 1873, the United States Army, while still not sure how best to employ the 
machine gun, began to understand the power of the weapon and its effectiveness against 
infantry. Further, the Gilmore board noted that the weapon was similar in effectiveness to 
a 12-pounder Napoleon artillery piece, although the Gatling suffered in terms of 
elevation.19 One item the board did not discuss was the cost of the weapon. David 
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Armstrong cited a figure of fifteen hundred dollars. The Springfield cost eighteen dollars, 
and the Gillmore board noted that a .50-caliber Gatling gun was as effective as forty 
rifles. Thus, the army was experimenting with a weapon that cost fifteen hundred dollars, 
which was equal in efficiency to forty men with Springfields, which cost the army 720 
dollars, just under half as much. The army procured weapons that cost twice as much as 
cheaper solutions, but were more efficient because they required fewer soldiers as gun 
crews, demonstrated that the army was not conservative as it sought weapons to give its 
forces more firepower, especially in an era when the size of the regular army continually 
decreased. The Gatling was more expensive, but ensured that on the battlefield the 
American Army could still deliver an immense amount of firepower. During the period 
following the American Civil War, the size of the regular army dwindled so much that an 
infantry company often could muster only twenty-nine privates, and some, such as the 
Seventh United States Infantry in 1877, only twenty-four men per company.20 Three to 
five men serving a quick-firing Gatling gun could then do the work of almost two 
infantry companies in an open field.21 
  A board of engineers that convened in January and February 1874 arrived at a 
different conclusion, stating that while the Gatling gun had utility in “special cases,” 
larger forts did not need the weapons for flank defense. The engineers argued that its use 
in smaller forts with limited garrisons was more practical.22 Such arguments demonstrate 
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that the army saw the Gatling as a means to give smaller groups of soldiers more 
firepower, and in traditional European combat roles. 
  Convinced of the merits of the weapon, the United States Army procured 497 of 
the weapons between 1866 and 1893 in three different calibers. Of the 1-inch caliber, the 
army acquired 51, with 19 .30-caliber in 1893, and the remaining 427 in .45-caliber, the 
same as the new service rifle. By the 1880 alone, the army had 284 pieces, and added still 
more that year.23 As the army considered each gun equal to 40 Springfield rifles, in total 
the Gatlings were equal to 11,360 infantrymen, while requiring no more than 1,420 crew 
to operate, a great saving of manpower at a time when the authorized strength of the army 
was close to 25,000 men.24  
  In trials, the army considered the Gatling gun a superb artillery piece. In field use, 
its accuracy beyond 250 yards made it more effective against troops than an artillery 
piece firing canister shot, while a single piece achieved more hits and caused more 
damage than two twelve-pounder howitzers and an eight-inch rifle at five hundred and 
eight hundred yards. While impressive, the army still preferred shell artillery, and the 
rifle-caliber Gatling to the 1-inch model.25 Due to faulty artillery shells, the report of a 
trials committee in 1871, argued “a body of troops having to advance.… over any 
distance within 1,200 yards, would suffer far more from Gatling guns delivering an 
incessant and wide-spread fire.… than from field guns.”26 General Dyer so loved the 
weapon that he argued that the new .45-caliber Gatlings procured in 1873 would “be far 
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more effective in Indian warfare than the mountain-howitzer heretofore in use.”27 
  Historian Robert M. Utley argues that, on the contrary, the Gatling was inefficient 
against Native Americans. General Nelson A. Miles declared that the weapons were 
“worthless for Indian fighting,” primarily because they used the .50- and .45-caliber rifle 
bullets, which made determining the effectiveness of hits difficult at long range.28 The 
weapon was also bulky, like any artillery piece, and decreased the speed of an otherwise 
fast-moving column of light infantry or cavalry. Further, the crews assigned to these 
weapons were often infantrymen untrained in the proper use of the weapon. Utley noted 
that the Hotchkiss Mountain gun, in comparison, was popular and Miles argued that 
through all of his campaigns, only the area around the modern Yellowstone National Park 
was unsuitable for the latter weapon’s portability.29 
  The United States Army, in testing the Gatling, never examined its effect against 
single targets, representing individual soldiers of Indian braves, but, instead, created 
targets that simulated troop columns, similar to the battlefields of Gettysburg or 
Koniggratz. The fall of shot against single targets was, as Miles pointed out, hard to 
discern, and was just as difficult as observing the effects of rifle fire at long range. 
Against masses of troops, the effectiveness of the fire of Gatling guns, or twelve-pounder 
Napoleon field pieces, was easily discernable. As canister fire or thousands of .45-caliber 
balls rained down on infantry marching in perfect Napoleonic order, or targets that 
represented them, army officers could easily see the effects of the weapons. In the field, 
when Indians did not bunch up as the targets did on the proving ground, and when they 
dragged their wounded off, the weapons appeared ineffective, possibly more than they 
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really were.30 Against European-style targets, an arms board claimed that the Gatling’s 
“efficiency in field-works, not only for flank but for direct fire, seems unquestionable.”31 
  Army officers thought the Gatling perfect for the flank defense of forts, but 
quickly realized that it possessed other practical uses as well. The Gillmore board limited 
itself to the testing of the weapon in fortification roles, but noted that protection of 
villages, entrenched positions, counter-battery fire, and stopping infantry and cavalry 
charges with practical uses “conceded for the Gatling gun.”32 General William B. 
Franklin noted that British military strategists argued that the rifle-caliber pieces had an 
effective range of up to fourteen-hundred yards, while the larger ones, such as the army’s 
1-inch caliber, had ranges exceeding two thousand yards. Franklin asserted this ability 
made them effective field pieces, perfectly suited to counter-battery fire, preventing an 
enemy field gun from opening fire against friendly infantry.33  
  Such thought demonstrates that the United States Army was not interested in the 
weapon for its Indian-fighting abilities; after all, Native Americans did not fight in line or 
use Krupp field guns. The Gatling was perfect for decimating infantry formations or, 
thanks to its range, silencing enemy pieces or dislodging a prepared position before an 
infantry attack.34 These objectives are what the Gatling Gun Company designed the 
weapon for, not firing at single targets at long range, as Robert Utley suggests.35 In Indian 
fighting, the gun simply acted like a multi-barreled rifle, which greatly limited its 
effectiveness. In the Franco-Prussian War, as French gunners could not sweep their 
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weapons from side to side along the rank of an infantry formation, they usually fired 
upward of thirty rounds into a single man, before changing targets.36 The weapons were 
not yet fully effective, but the fact that early weapons comparable to the American-
designed Gatling had such limitations, army officers understood that the weapon’s prime 
usefulness was against European-style formations.37 
  Comparing Army officers’ dislike of the Gatling gun for Indian warfare, but yet 
their unending praise for the anti-personnel abilities of the weapon in hypothetical usage, 
demonstrate exactly what kind of fighting force the army saw itself as during the 
breechloader era: a European-style, volley-firing, artillery-wielding army. The tests of the 
Gatling gun referred to in the Ordnance Department’s Ordnance Memoranda 17 
demonstrate scenarios of fighting a traditional European style army: attack columns, 
bodies of men, attack on forts, sweeping targets representing lines of men, and tests 
involving combined rifle, artillery, canister, shell, and Gatling fire.38 The army trained as 
Europeans, and failed to train to fire at scattered Indian warriors who took cover 
wherever possible.  
  Instead of ascertaining the viability of new weapons in frontier constabulary roles, 
the American Army trained to use its weapons, and tested their effectiveness, as if they 
would be fighting Bismarck’s Prussians in France rather than Sitting Bull’s braves at the 
Little Big Horn. In this vein, the United States was also keen on examining the lessons of 
the Franco-Prussian War, and how the French employed their Montignys and Reyffes.39 
The weapons were poor against Indians, but as they began to come into use in Europe, 
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and as they afforded the ability to offset the small size of the regular army, the army 
continued to test them and procured them in great numbers.40 
  The same argument, that is what Europe did or did not do, also influenced 
American concepts of magazine rifles. Robert Utley notes how Indians acquired repeaters 
in ever greater numbers, and how an attempt by Colonel Ranald Mackenzie to rearm his 
regiment with Winchester repeaters failed.41 While the United States Army in the early 
1890s demonstrated a trend of conservatism against the magazine rifle, causing one New 
York Times author to claim the army was “wedded” to the Springfield rifle, this 
conservative attitude did not exist in the 1870s.42 In praising the service rifle in 1880, 
General Stephen V. Benét claimed, “as a single breechloader it has no superior as a 
military arm and…. it will not be superseded by anything short of a magazine gun. The 
latter will be unquestionably adopted, and we will as certainly do so.”43 He called for 
continued magazine gun trials in 1880, and noted that, much like the 1866 Arms Board, 
the cavalry needed a magazine carbine.44 
  The United States, as early as 1874, wanted to increase the rate of fire of its 
Springfield rifles. The musket-like appearance did not lend itself well to the fitting of a 
magazine, as would be done on European bolt-action rifles such as the Italian Vetterli, 
Dutch Beaumont, or German Mauser, all originally adopted in 1871.45 The lack of 
upgradeability of the Springfield was its biggest handicap, but that does not make the 
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army’s choice in 1873 conservative. Any upgrade to the Springfield rifle would simply 
have taken money away from funds used to procure, test, or build new smokeless 
magazine rifles. The United States Army could not convert the Springfield to a magazine 
rifle like the Dutch did with their Beaumont, but the American Army also adopted a 
smokeless magazine rifle three years earlier than Holland, although production did not 
begin until 1894.46 Conversions extended the usefulness of the old weapons to a degree, 
but the introduction of smokeless powder rendered all black-powder weapons obsolete.  
  As a true magazine, whether box or tubular, was impractical, the United States 
experimented with cartridge blocks for the Springfield. Holding eight cartridges, a soldier 
could fix the wooden block to the rifle by means of a wire cam and a leather strap, 
holding it securely to the rifle and protecting it from firing and recoil.47 Most military 
rifle magazines of the era possessed cut offs so that soldiers could, in effect, deactivate 
the magazines on their rifles and so that their superiors could discern whether a trooper 
was using his magazine. The advantage of the cartridge block, towards this line of 
thinking, was that it was so bulky and obvious that it was easily visible whether the 
soldier was making use of it. It also had the advantage of allowing the soldier to maintain 
a high rate of fire while firing prone – the lever action of repeaters such as the Spencer, 
Henry, or Winchester made rapid prone firing difficult, as the lever of the weapon 
required the soldier to roll or move, thus exposing him to fire. Finally, the cartridge block 
allowed the soldier to see exactly how many rounds he had left, something enclosed 
magazines prohibited.48 The United States Army proceeded slowly, and while not fully 
adopting the device, by 1877 government arsenals boasted a mix of cartridge belts, 
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blocks, and boxes for regular issue. By 1877, the Ordnance Department issued 1,490 of 
the block devices to regular army units. The army did not outright adopt a device to 
facilitate increased rates of fire, but it did not act in a conservative manner as it at least 
examined such inventions and proved willing to adopt large numbers of them for 
testing.49 
  During the breechloader era, until magazine guns began to become dominate in 
the mid to late 1880s, the United States Army was not a conservative power, as it adopted 
technologies on par with those in use in Europe and trained to use them in the European 
manner. In doing so, the army faced severe difficulties in the use of its rifles, artillery, 
and machine-guns against enemy combatants during the Indian Wars. Weapons that were 
“perfect” and “modern” in a traditional military sense, like the Gatling gun, proved 
ineffective against Indians, while armaments effective towards Native Americans, such as 
the magazine rifle, were out of place in European-style combat. In making either choice, 
the army faced criticism of being conservative. Despite its small size, the United States 
military considered itself a professional, regular army, one that had always trained and 
fought like a European-style fighting force. To abandon all of that, for the sake of 
pacifying Indians, was too much for the army to contemplate. Instead, it continued to 
model itself after a force that, according to General Philip J. Sheridan during his 
observation of the Franco-Prussian War, could best the Prussians in combat if they had 
the chance.50 The United States Army armed, trained, and fought like a European army. It 
faced handicaps because of its methods during the Indian Wars, but for what it tried to 
do, be a traditional, volley-firing, line-fighting army, it was not conservative.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
“CONSIDERED A MORE SERVICEABLE GUN:”  
THE SPRINGFIELD AND EUROPEAN ARMS, 1875-1885 
 
  During the decade following the adoption of the new .45-caliber Springfield rifle, 
the United States Army continually tried to improve the weapon, to make it more reliable, 
functional, accurate, and cost effectiveness. The aim of the Ordnance Department was to 
create the perfect battle rifle, as it had intended all along.  To this end, the United States 
Army compared its new arm with those of Europe, as it had done during arms tests in 
1872 and 1873. They argued that the arm was superior to those used in Europe, and 
indeed in tests against European arms, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, confirm that 
rather than being an inferior arm demonstrating poor choice and conservatism by the 
Ordnance Department, the Springfield was an excellent arm comparable to those in use in 
Europe during the same period. 
  During the arms tests leading up to the adoption of the new Model 1873 
Springfield, the United States had a chance to compare the Allin rifle with those in use in 
Europe. For serviceability, reliability, accuracy, and other factors, the United States chose 
the American-designed Springfield rifle. The tests also gave the United States insight into 
the performance of European weapons. Instead of focusing solely on the domestic Indian
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problems, the United States Army sought to compare itself with the forces then in 
Europe. 
  As opposed to the exemplary performance of the Springfield, the Terry Arms 
board had harsh criticism of many of the arms used in Europe, many of which boasted 
seemingly more modern designs than that used by Erskine S. Allin. For the 1872-1873 
tests, the United States asked for two arms each from Britain, France, Russia, 
Switzerland, Austria, and Prussia, plus one thousand rounds of ammunition for each, and 
later secured a Dutch Beaumont Rifle as well.1 France, then engaged in designing a 
metallic cartridge conversion to its Chassepot rifle, did not send rifles or ammunition, 
while the Prussians sent a Zundnadelgewehr, but due to their efforts to adopt a metallic 
cartridge for their new rifle sent no ammunition. Only the British and the Russians sent 
two guns, all of the other nations only sent one.2   
  In these tests, the pieces often performed less than desired considering that they 
were all standard issue military arms. The Beaumont Rifle (see Figures Seven, Eight, 
Eleven, and Twelve), adopted in 1871, featured a bolt mechanism similar to rifles, and 
was later suitable to conversion to a magazine system. The weapon and ammunition were 
not suited to sustained firing, and after one hundred shots, the weapon was “badly fouled 
and leaded,” with accuracy reduced accordingly.3 The Terry Board described the 
accuracy of the Austrian Werndl after firing but sixty rounds as “completely wild.”4 The 
American-designed Russian Berdan, despite using lubricated ammunition, also had heavy 
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fouling like the Beaumont after one hundred rounds. This Swiss Vetterli was relatively 
free of fouling after one hundred rounds, but required special lubricated ammunition. The 
Board noted that only the Martini-Henry proved reliable and unfouled after firing one 
hundred rounds.5 While the board did not comment on the fouling of the Springfield, the 
St. Louis Arms Board of 1870 subjected a Model 1868 Springfield Rifle, Serial Number 
14515, to an endurance test firing five hundred rounds, and while the barrel “slightly 
fouled” after the first one hundred rounds, they noted nothing on fouling for the 
subsequent four hundred shots. 6  
  The adoption of the Springfield was not conservative, but common sense – 
American trials, and the United States Army, demonstrated that in 1873 the Springfield 
system was superior to the majority of arms then in use in Europe. That did not 
necessarily change over time, as in 1889 an author in the British Westminster Review 
described the Springfield as “being considered a more serviceable gun than the Martini-
Henry, nearly as easy to load quickly, simpler in construction, stronger, and quite as 
accurate as the latter.”7 The Martini-Henry was among the best rifles in the world, and 
observers in the United States and Britain argued that the Springfield was equal to the 
Martini-Henry. Although the Springfield had problems, such as at The Little Big Horn, 
the adoption of the Springfield was no more conservative than the adoption of the 
Martini-Henry. 
  American comparisons with the new British service rifle did not end in 1873. The 
Martini-Henry had greater penetration during the 1872 tests, achieved by more powder 
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and a heavier bullet, at the expense of heavier recoil.8 The Army wanted to improve the 
Springfield, and as the Martini-Henry was the best of the foreign breechloaders, 
according to the Terry Board, Captain John E. Greer of the Ordnance Department began 
extensive tests between the two weapons in 1879 to determine superiority in ballistics, 
velocity, penetration, recoil, and range. The impetus for the test was the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-1878, and an article in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 
entitled “Lessons from the Late War,” by Captain John L. Needham.9 Whereas after the 
Franco-Prussian War military tacticians seriously questioned the effect and validity of 
long range firing, the Russo-Turkish War stirred some to advocate that since most armies 
possessed a new generation of breechloaders, being of smaller caliber and higher power 
than those used during Bismarck’s wars, long-range firing was now an “imperative 
necessity.”10 Instead of hold their fire until an effective range, the Turks fired as soon as 
the Russians came into view, causing “immense loss” to advancing Russian troops, while 
consuming a massive quantity of ammunition. The effect of the fire was severe, soldiers 
crossing a mile of open territory lost half of their number killed, wounded, or routed 
because of the hail of gunfire.11 
  Although the performance of the Turks was impressive, such exploits required an 
immense amount of ammunition. Needham noted that experiments in Europe garnered 
some successes, at fifteen hundred yards Swiss troops with Vetterlis hit 9 percent of their 
targets, while at the same distance Germans with Mausers managed between 8 and 22 
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percent accuracy, depending on the arrangement of the targets.12  While such hypothetical 
losses to an enemy were achievable, the amount of ammunition required would be 
enormous, as soldiers would fire numerous cartridges well before enemy troops closed to 
the supposed “effective range” taught by military theorists. Needham noted that Turks 
often fired as much as five hundred rounds per man during a campaign and never ran 
short of ammunition.13 For long-range fire to be effective ammunition was a critical 
factor – arsenals needed to produce a simple cartridge in massive quantity, one that 
possessed great range and did not cause jamming or fouling.  
  In 1879, with a desire to determine how the American rifle faired against its 
European competitors in the aspect of long-range firing, the Ordnance Department 
undertook tests at the Sandy Hook proving ground in New Jersey between the Model 
1873 Springfield and the Martini Henry. Captain John Greer concluded the Springfield 
the superior weapon, having less recoil, more velocity, and better accuracy; although in 
terms of penetration and shooting in high winds, the Martini bested the American arm.14 
Greer also compared the Springfield and Martini carbines, and noted that the Springfield 
carbine was inferior not by design, but because in 1879 American carbines used a lighter 
.45-55 load, containing only fifty-five grains of powder, as opposed to the seventy-grain 
load used by infantry rifles.15 These tests demonstrated that heavier bullets decreased 
flight time of the projectile after firing, and gave a flatter trajectory, which translated into 
better accuracy.  As a result, in 1885 the army adopted the five hundred grain bullet as 
standard in its .45-caliber cartridge, in an attempt to improve the qualities of an otherwise 
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excellent rifle, proving once again that while a good breech-loading system was 
important, an army had to have effective and accurate ammunition to make the weapon 
successful.16 
  The American Army had difficulty with .45-caliber cartridges in its new 
Springfield rifle, and the British experienced several problems with their Snider-Enfields 
and Martini-Henrys as well. In 1885, British soldiers firing Martini-Henry rifles at Abu 
Klea in the Sudan encountered severe problems extracting cartridges, as sand entered the 
actions of the rifles and jammed the rifles. Observers reported that “’hundreds of 
cartridges jammed,’” while others argued that the rifles could fire only a few rounds 
before the action froze.17 The result was that Arab forces reached a British square as both 
the Martinis and the Gardner machine-gun jammed, resulting in 150 British soldiers 
killed.18 Just as happened to the Springfield at the Little Big Horn, faulty ammunition put 
the Martini Henry out of action. Because of these deficiencies and the disaster at Abu 
Klea, detractors launched a press campaign against the rifle. The British Army responded 
by introducing improved drawn brass cartridges and adopting the Martini-Henry Mark IV 
rifle, which featured a longer loading lever to facilitate better extraction with stuck 
cartridges.19 Later in the decade, British officers and commentators had mixed opinions 
on the Martini-Henry. Most agreed that the rifle’s problems lay in its ammunition with 
one editorialist claiming the “less said [about the Martini’s ammunition] the better.”20 
The same columnist described the committee that adopted the Martini-Henry as 
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“mechanically ignorant” for refusing to consider bolt-action designs such as the Mauser 
or the Gras.21 In 1890, another author, while noting that ammunition problems plagued 
the rifle in the Sudan, argued, “This Martini action is to this day the most perfect breech 
action that has ever been devised for military rifles,” noting that new drawn brass cases 
corrected any flaws in the rifle.22 Even the iconic British Martini-Henry rifle sustained 
much of the same criticism levied at the American Springfield. Both rifles had faults, but 
faulty ammunition was the major handicap of the two weapons. 
  In addition to ammunition, the United States army also sought ways to improve 
the basic service rifle by adding an integral bayonet in an attempt to remove the blade 
altogether. During the 1873 arms board that selected the .45-caliber Springfield rifle, 
General Alfred H. Terry commented that he thought “the day of the bayonet has passed 
away. Just as the pike yielded to the muzzle-loading firearm with the bayonet, so this 
latter must yield to the breech-loading arm without the bayonet.”23 At the same time, he 
also argued that the perceived uselessness of the bayonet created the possibility to reduce 
the weight of a soldier’s kit by eliminating the piece.24 The attempts to create an effective 
rifle with an integral bayonet, and thus discard the traditional bladed bayonet, 
demonstrates a lack of conservatism as the Ordnance Department, and men like General 
Terry, expressed interest at abandoning a piece of equipment, the blade bayonet, used for 
centuries in traditional armies. 
  To that end, on January 30, 1878 Steven V. Benét officially recommended to the 
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Secretary of War the “abolition of the bayonet and saber.”25 Colonel James G. Benton, 
commanding officer of the Springfield Armory, submitted a design of a ramrod bayonet 
based on the type used by the Model 1819 Hall breech-loading rifle.26 The proposed 
ramrod bayonet occupied the space of the normal cleaning rod, but allowed the soldier to 
shed the weight of a blade bayonet and scabbard. By not needing to manufacture a blade, 
and as the army already manufactured cleaning rods for its rifles, they army saved both 
weight on its soldiers and money in the manufacture of weapons and accoutrements.27 
Benét argued that the saber and the bayonet “must yield to the revolver and rifle – cold 
steel to gunpowder and lead.”28 By June 30, 1881, the national armory fabricated 1,014 of 
the new Springfield Ramrod Bayonet rifles, alongside 15,014 regular-issue Springfield 
rifles, 10,000 carbines, and 500 cadet rifles.29 Some of these new rifles suffered faults not 
endemic to the other varieties. For example, all 250 of the rod bayonet rifles issued to 
troops in Cheyenne, Wyoming Territory had improperly adjusted rifle sights. Despite the 
poor sights, Captain F. Heath of the Ordnance Department reported that the rifles “have 
been received with favor,” part of their desirability being that prior to these rifles, “the 
bayonet, owing, perhaps, somewhat to the inconvenience of carrying it with the cartridge 
belt, is seldom or never taken into the field.”30 
  While the rifles may have achieved some notability in the Wyoming Territory, 
Captain Stanhope E. Blunt, Chief Ordnance Officer in the Dakota Territory, argued that 
the weapons “give general dissatisfaction,” as they too had poor and unadjusted sights.31 
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Here, the Ordnance Department issued rifles to one company each of the Third, Seventh, 
Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-Fifth Infantry Regiments. Despite the problem that 
a soldier had to remain stationary to fix and unfix the rod bayonet, as opposed to on the 
run, Blunt was not opposed to the concept of the rifle. He advocated either replacing the 
Model 1880 rifles with rod bayonet rifles of improved patterns, or scrapping them 
completely, as the trials rifles were unsatisfactory. 32 
  Wanting to continue to improve the design and refusing to abandon the concept, 
the army adopted a new model of Springfield, the Model 1884 ramrod bayonet rifle. 
These new weapons suffered from problems as well. A new sight, adopted in 1884, 
proved “liable to injury,” as screws came loose from use and the sight leaf, prone to 
sliding during firing, caused “inaccuracy in target practice and rapid firing.”33 In addition, 
the locking mechanism on the early rifles sometimes failed to work with the bayonet 
fixed, and during firing it occasionally “jump[ed] out an inch or two at each discharge.”34  
  The Model 1884 Rod Bayonet Springfields were unsuccessful, but the army 
continued to experiment with the concept, and the last production model of the 
Springfield was the Model 1888 Rod Bayonet rifle. These rifles were not trial patterns 
but production pieces, with 21,361 produced by the middle of 1891.35 If the object of the 
rod bayonet system was weight savings, the effect was negligible. With a regular issue 
.45-caliber Springfield, Model 1873 or 1884 (without rod bayonet), the American soldier 
carried 54 pounds, 1.85 ounces of equipment, clothing, and weaponry, if issued a 
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cartridge box. With a cartridge belt, the weight dropped to 53 pounds, 15.96 ounces. If 
issued a cartridge belt and a rod bayonet Springfield, Model 1880, 1884, or 1888, the 
weight dropped an additional 13.38 ounces to 53 pounds, 2.58 ounces. The early rod 
bayonet Springfields were disappointments that proved poor in service and not up to the 
standards of production rifles, with negligible weight savings. At the normal issue weight 
for a soldier carrying a rifle using a blade bayonet, compared with the armies of Britain, 
Germany, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy, only the German soldier carried less weight 
in equipment, and even then only by two pounds.36  The Ordnance Department’s 
pursuance of the rod bayonet demonstrated both that the army sought to continually 
improve its rifle despite already considering it the best design, and that by the middle of 
the 1880s the army began to adopt a conservative attitude and refused to accept new 
technology or abandon those concepts that did not work or showed their obsolescence. 
While the Krag-Jorgensen rifle that succeeded the Springfield featured a knife bayonet, 
also a departure from previous American rifles, the rod bayonet concept appeared on its 
successor, the Model 1903 Springfield. It took none other than President Theodore 
Roosevelt describing the rod bayonet on the Model 1903 as “about as poor an invention 
as I ever saw” to the Secretary of War to effect a change.37 With such a statement, 
Springfield Armory modified the weapon immediately to accept a knife bayonet, and 
finally abandoned the rod bayonet concept.38
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSION:  
THE END OF AN ERA AND A CHANGE TO CONSERVATISM, 1885-1892 
 
  For two years, in 1877 and 1878, Russian and Turkish troops fought each other in 
yet another of the many Russo-Turkish Wars so common to European history. During the 
latter six months of 1877, Russian forces besieged the town of Plevna, fighting at least 
four major actions before finally taking the town. The Russians took heavy casualties 
before succeeding, thanks in large part to Turks armed with Winchester repeating rifles. 
The Turks lost, but their American-made rifles demonstrated that infantry could produce 
a withering hail of fire at a range of 220 yards. While not practical for long-range firing, 
the ability of a numerically weaker Turkish force to hold off the Russians, armed with 
breechloaders, for so long caused European nations and the United States to consider 
rearming with magazine rifles. Initially after the conflict, military experiments focused on 
long-range accuracy and ballistics, but armies began to examine other lessons, 
specifically magazines and repeating rifles. Trials such as those held at Sandy Hook in 
1879 extended the life of the breechloader, but more nations began to experiment with 
magazine rifles or modifying their service rifles into repeaters. The age of the breech-
loading rifle was over, and even officers in the United States Ordnance Department
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realized their beloved Springfield would give way to the magazine-fed repeater. The 
army tested various magazine rifle types, but the exercised indecisiveness and caution, 
and despite what Europe had done, the United States Army did not want to give up its 
beloved service rifle until well after Europe rearmed. 1 
  The Ordnance Department, as it had done in the 1860s and 1870s, procured 
examples of various weapon systems and tested them.  On the orders of General Stephen 
V. Benét, an arms board convened starting on July 5, 1881, and lasted for fifteen months 
testing various repeating systems. The board examined forty different rifles, based on 
thirteen different magazine and action systems, but like the arms boards of the past could 
not decide on a single system, and, instead, chose three. The board of officers classed the 
Lee rifle, the Chaffee-Reece, and the Hotchkiss magazine rifles as “suitable for military 
service.”2 The board was also less satisfied with the idea of perfection than the previous 
arms boards. The board report noted that on the Lee rifle, for example, that the weapon’s 
magazine often dented the bullets contained in it, and often dropped out of the rifle – both 
circumstances highly unfavorable for a military arm, and yet they recommended it as one 
of the three suitable for use.3 A month after the board adjourned, on October 9, 1882, 
Benét requested fifty thousand dollars to procure magazine rifles of all three systems for 
field trials.4 
  During the trials of the three weapons, the United States Ordnance Department 
reversed itself and became stringently conservative. In 1882, the army received the fifty-
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thousand dollar appropriation to test the three types of rifles. In 1884, General Benét 
stated they would “be sent into the field… early next spring.”5 The next year, 1885, he 
reported that the results from the field were not yet in, as they arrived in December, well 
after his annual report.6 Regarding the breechloader, in 1865 the stubborn General Dyer 
used his position to have some types of breech-loading rifle manufactured, so that the 
army could gain experience with them immediately and, at least as stopgap measures, 
possess an ample supply of the new weapons, while Springfield Armory made 
improvements to the weapons and issued more the following year. Benét took two years 
to issue a small number of magazine rifles to the troops, and over another year to tabulate 
the reports. Dyer, in comparison, had the national armory issue five-thousand First Allin 
conversion Springfields within one year, and the next year authorized production of a 
second, improved model for field-testing, with fifty thousand additional breechloaders 
manufactured and issued by 1867.7 Benét had no sense of urgency with the new 
magazine weapons, and did not even report on their feasibility until October 1886, four 
years after receiving the appropriation.8  
  Part of the Ordnance Department’s lethargy might have stemmed from the 
excellent qualities of the Springfield, especially its rate of fire. One armorer, A. Cranston, 
fired two hundred rounds out of a Springfield in twelve minutes averaging about 
seventeen rounds per minute.  As the rifle featured no magazine, officers did not worry 
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about soldiers wasting ammunition, even during independent fire, which was one of the 
motivators behind the suggested cartridge-block device.9 Benét had a poor sense of 
timing when he finally issued the reports on the magazine rifles then under consideration 
by the United States Army. Seven months later, on April 22, 1887, France adopted the 
Modèle 1886 Lebel smokeless, magazine rifle, and made every other military rifle 
obsolete.10 
  Benét acted slowly in procuring magazine rifles, and by 1886, the army fell victim 
to the love of a rifle that it had used for over a decade. Comparing the preferences of the 
various infantry companies that tested the magazine rifles, the officers reported that for 
magazine uses, the Lee was the better rifle. For single loading, regular issue, and a 
weapon of choice, American infantry officers voted overwhelmingly in favor of the 
Springfield rifle.  The Chief of Ordnance did not want to give the army a magazine rifle, 
firmly convinced that the army needed to wait until an inventor submitted a perfect 
design, and infantry company commanders wanted to keep their beloved Springfields. He 
claimed at the end of his report that, “I have been and am an advocate for a magazine 
gun, but it would seem the part of wisdom to postpone for the present any further efforts 
towards the adoption of a suitable magazine arm for the service.”11 He closed the section 
by stating, “The Springfield rifle gives such general satisfaction to the Army that we can 
safely wait a reasonable time for further developments of magazine systems.”12 Dyer 
wanted to delay general adoption of a breechloader to adopt a perfect system, but he also 
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recognized that the army needed to rearm quickly. Benét did not grasp that concept, and 
as most major militaries began to experiment with magazine guns, and on the eve of a 
rearmament as great as that which followed the Prussian Wars of 1864-1870, the army 
decided it could “safely wait a reasonable time” until something better came along. 
  Benét’s small arms report for 1887 reads with a sense of urgency that reveals he 
knew how critical the situation had become. Benét argued for tests to determine a 
reduction of caliber of small arms and suitability of magazine arms, as “there is a 
movement in that direction in military circles here and abroad,” and “an effective and 
simple magazine gun has become a necessity.”13 He recognized the problem, but was 
unwilling to act quickly, as he did not want to adopt an inferior arm or interim solution, 
believing that no good magazine arm existed. Citing caution and warning of “haste,” he 
asserted “the Springfield arm will continue to admirably serve our purpose and the best 
interests of the Army, long enough, to enable us to determine finally on a magazine 
gun.”14 Benét was so unconcerned that his 1888 report only mentioned magazine rifles 
three times, in each case to the twenty each of Lee, Hotchkiss, and Chaffee-Reece 
magazine rifles, issued to the military for trials.15 
  When the Army finally began to examine the magazine rifle, it took so much from 
the Springfield that it, in effect, created a single-loading rifle that had a magazine. The 
United States Army committed itself to the single-loading doctrine of the Springfield and 
designed the new magazine rifle around that concept.  The military intended to use the 
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weapon primarily as a single-loader, with the magazine only used in emergencies or in 
the last moment before a charge.  The Ordnance Department created a weapon so 
perfectly around these requirements that it proved inferior to the magazine rifles of 
foreign nations and impractical.  Long after the Army abandoned the doctrine of the 
single-shot weapon in favor of clip-fed repeaters, the Krag's design forced its continued 
use primarily as a single-loader (see Figures Thirteen and Fourteen).   
  The Krag featured a five-round magazine and a magazine cutoff that turned the 
magazine “off” and prevented a soldier from using it in combat without orders.   Army 
officers, clinging to the doctrine of the 1880s, decided soldiers should only use the 
magazine in emergencies.   The rifle had no charger guides such as the new German-
made export Mausers going to South America (see Figure Fifteen) or packet-magazine 
systems similar to the rifles adopted in the 1890s by Germany, Austria, or Italy (See 
Figure Sixteen).16 New Mauser rifles featured guides that allowed a soldier to position a 
clip containing rounds on top of a rifle’s receiver, and push the cartridges into the 
magazine and recharge the magazine with the same effort that an American soldier 
loaded a single round into his Krag-Jorgensen.17 
  The Krag’s design possessed a number of flaws that hampered its success.  The 
rear sight on the original incarnation of the weapon was not accurate, and many army 
officers declared the Springfield a better service rifle.  In one instance, a prison guard 
with a Krag-Jorgensen proved unable to hit an escaping prisoner despite firing three 
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times.  The New York Times ran several articles describing the failures of the weapon, the 
most prominent being that it shot high.18   
  The army liked its single-loading Springfield, and did not want a true repeater. 
With the influence being on loading rounds one at a time, the Army saw no reason to 
allow rapid charging of the magazine.19  This problem did not hamper other nations.  The 
Mannlicher used a packet-loading system, where a soldier inserted a charger containing 
five cartridges into the magazine, and the packet formed part of the system.  When he 
chambered the last round, the clip dropped out of the rifle.20  The German Mausers 
produced for export, not to be confused with the old black powder Mausers of the 1870s 
and 1880s, utilized a system where an infantryman stripped off five cartridges into the 
magazine from a clip and discarded it.21  The Krag featured no such ability to be charger 
loaded, and, in battle, the American soldier had to load his magazine one round at a time, 
with the same motion that it took to load a breechloader after every shot.  This action 
meant that even when magazine firing, a soldier with a Krag could manage only about 
twenty-two rounds per minute, or only five more than with a Springfield that did not 
possess a magazine.  When using the cutoff on the Krag, the normal rate of fire was about 
twenty-one rounds a minute.22  Except for the seldom-used ability to deliver a large 
amount of firepower in a short period, the rifle in practice was a single-loader, like the 
rifle it replaced.  
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  Army officers did not consider the ability to charge a magazine rapidly important 
to a successful design.  Captain Stanhope Blunt, who earlier touted the failures of the rod 
bayonet Springfield, in “The Modern Infantry Rifle,” recommended the feature in a 
treatise on the requirements of a successful pattern, but still reported that the Model 1892 
Krag fulfilled the majority of the requirements he set forth.23  Blunt described various 
actions of magazine rifles in use 1894, and criticized those actions not adaptable to single 
loading.  The essay focused on the qualities that allowed soldiers to use a magazine rifle 
as an effective single-loader, which he argued was their usual employment.  He feared 
that weapons using packet clips and feeding from the magazine deprived infantrymen of 
a reserve at a critical moment in battle.  For these rifles, such as the Mannlicher, 
quartermasters did not issue single rounds to the soldiers but only chargers with five 
rounds, and the design of the weapon did not allow for loading more cartridges until 
soldier emptied his clip.  Blunt decried Mauser style rifles that did not possess a cutoff, 
because he feared that a soldier would forget to load a fresh round and inadvertently use 
his magazine reserve.24   Concerning the proper use of the modern rifle, he stated “the 
normal use of [these] guns.... [are] as single loaders, with the magazine always retained 
as a reserve.”25 
  Blunt considered the use of the magazine as an auxiliary to the rifle.  A magazine 
provided a reserve to conserve ammunition and prevent wasted ammunition, as well as to 
contribute a “moral support which the knowledge of this reserve is presumed to give.”26 
As soldiers used their weapons in this manner, they carried rounds singly in belts and the 
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American rifle did not require any method to facilitate rapid charger loading.  The most 
severe handicap of the Krag-Jorgensen design in 1894 fit exactly with the army's concept 
of the magazine rifle.  The lack of a charger prevented a soldier from wasting rounds, 
and, in his words, gave the trooper a reserve with “moral support” in combat.  
  Two years after Blunt's essay, army doctrine still failed to grasp the ability of the 
magazine rifle.  Captain Lawrence Bruff of the United States Ordnance Department, in 
the 1896 publication of Text-Book of Ordnance and Gunnery, set forth principles of 
infantry weapons and described in detail both the .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen and .45-
caliber Springfield, the latter then in use by National Guard troops.  Unlike Blunt, Bruff 
recognized that the primary advantage of a magazine rifle was the ability to “furnish a 
certain number of shots in a very small interval of time.”  He did not realize the amount 
of firepower such a weapon could produce given a rapidly chargeable magazine and a 
steady supply of ammunition.  Instead, he argued that to utilize the magazine rifle to its 
fullest potential the magazine had to be kept in reserve and concluded “a good magazine 
arm should be also a good single-loader.”27 
  Thus, before its combat debut, the Krag fit exactly with army doctrine as a 
magazine rifle habitually used as a single-loader.  Convention shaped its design, and now 
the rifle shaped the training manuals and military thought.  The army did not intend to 
exploit the use of the magazine rifle. Even if military planners wanted to embrace the 
rifle's potential, the army designed the rifle so well around its requirements that it proved 
unsuitable to any methodology other than as a single-loader. 
  The army finally adopted the magazine rifle in an attempt to keep parity with 
foreign nations, but was not prepared to abandon the doctrine that it created for the 
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Springfield.  While the army tried to evaluate all magazine systems fairly, the single 
loading doctrine favored the Krag-Jorgensen design then in use by Denmark, though 
American service designers added a magazine cutoff to reinforce its perceived use as a 
single-shot weapon, with a magazine only as a reserve.28 Nevertheless, many officers 
continued to perceive the Springfield as the ultimate battle rifle.29  One journalist for the 
New York Times, covering the tests at the Magazine Arms Board in 1892, asserted that 
the American army had “wedded” itself to the Springfield and did not take the concept of 
adopting a new service rifle seriously.30  
  This assertion was true.  Under orders, designers at Springfield Armory attempted 
to chamber Springfields in the same .30-caliber cartridge that they designed for the new 
Krag.  Starting in 1891, Springfield Armory produced a small number of these 
experimental weapons.  Later in 1898, they created a smokeless round for the .45-caliber 
weapon.  The new powder developed a pressure in the barrel almost twice that of the 
original black-powder loading.  As a result, many of the rifles exploded during testing, a 
fact the army emphatically denied.31 Armorers and generals both saw a modified 
Springfield as an excellent compromise, keeping with army doctrine yet yielding the 
advantages of smokeless powder.  E. Very of the Hotchkiss Arms Company contended 
that in theory “the Springfield rifle with .30 caliber is a better and more reliable weapon 
than…. [a] magazine gun because it is just as rapid a shooter.”32  Clearly, the single-
loading doctrine directed the choice of the army's first standardized repeating rifle, if the 
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weapon would have the same rate of fire as a single-loader. 
  Army officers never saw the Krag as a revolutionary weapon.  E. Very 
underscored the army's thought.  The magazine rifle, in practice, would only fire as fast 
as a good single-loader.  The capability existed for rapid fire, but the army expected 
officers to control their men. Blunt stated that a good magazine rifle possessed a cutoff 
positioned on the weapon in a manner facilitating quick identification by the squad 
leader.33  This requirement allowed officers and sergeants to ensure that soldiers did not 
waste ammunition and deplete their supply.  The army, long after adopting the Krag, 
directed soldiers to use magazine rifles as single-loaders. Due to the doctrine's emphasis 
on single loading, the Krag proved more palatable to army officers than a true repeater, 
which is why they rejected the Mannlicher, Mauser, and Lee style rifles.  One journalist 
questioned the rigid enforcement of a magazine cutoff, concluding that soldiers “not 
disciplined enough to obey orders in firing will not be of much use on a battle field of the 
next war.”34 
  The United States Army, during the whole of the period 1864-1892, represents 
almost two different fighting forces with different philosophies on arms procurement. 
When confronted with the realization that the rifle musket – a weapon that the United 
States possessed for only nine years prior to 1864 – was no longer a viable weapon on the 
battlefield, the army quickly took steps to procure breech-loading rifles. For the 
American Army experience in the Civil War, a war in which both sides used less than 
four hundred thousand breechloaders as opposed to over one and a half million muskets, 
led to that conclusion.  
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  The breechloader adopted by the United States was modern, as it possessed an 
extractor and an ejector, was accurate, and most importantly used safe, center-fire 
metallic ammunition. These four items made an effective breechloader, not a bolt action. 
The British Snider exploded with poor ammunition and did not eject cartridges; the 
German 1871 Mauser had poor accuracy; the Martini-Henry did not possess the longest 
range; the Dutch Beaumont fouled after one hundred rounds; and even the Swiss Vetterli 
had problems, the tubular magazine changed the point of balance of the weapon as the 
shooter fired the cartridges.35  Even after the United States adopted its rifle, it sought to 
improve the weapon and remain competitive with European armies. The army issued new 
sights to the weapon, improved the range, hitting power, and ballistics qualities of its 
service cartridge, and long experimented with a means of creating a bayonet integral to 
the rifle. The Springfield, rather than being an outmoded converted musket, was an 
effective rifle on par with those used in Europe, considered, well into the 1880s, as good 
as the famed British Martini-Henry. 
  While foreign armies concerned themselves with breech-loading rifles only, the 
United States as part of a general rearmament at the end of the Civil War became the first 
nation to adopt machine-guns. True, like European militaries, the United States Army did 
not understand how to employ the pieces properly, but it spent vast sums of money 
procuring over four hundred of the weapons. The weapon finally adopted later became 
used the world over, and proved superior to those used in combat during the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870. 
  When examined solely from a domestic perspective, the United States Army 
Ordnance Department appears conservative, but when viewed from a global standpoint 
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the United States Army was, in fact, on par with the nations of Europe in firearms 
development. The army did have difficulties during the Indian Wars defeating its 
opponents, but those difficulties arose from its desire to fight, train, and equip itself like a 
European army. Many remember the army of this period as a conservative, cash-strapped 
frontier constabulary force that fought Indians, but in reality, while cost-conscious, it saw 
itself as a European-style army, and was equal to one with comparable weapons. 
  The United States Army only became conservative, at least in this period and 
when concerned with small-arms procurement, when confronted with a real need to adopt 
a magazine rifle quickly because of a general rearmament in Europe. In the age of the 
single-shot breechloader, the army was not conservative and was on par with the 
European forces it trained to fight. It sought new weapons, continued to improve standard 
issue rifles, and often experimented with magazine weapons well before many other 
nations. When not faced with an immediate requirement to move quickly to make a 
decision, the army acted slowly, but methodically, and compared its requirements to 
those of Europe. Once faced with the need to adopt something completely radical and 
new, the army failed and instead adopted a weapon so built around its requirements from 
the previous quarter century that, instead of adopting a magazine rifle that was 
competitive with those in use in Europe, it simply adopted another single-loader that 
happened to utilize a magazine. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: The British .577-caliber Snider-Enfield Mark III Cavalry Carbine
A British Mark III Snider Enfield Cavalry Carbine, dated 1870 and made by the Royal 
Small Arms Factory at Enfield. The British counterpart to the Allin Springfield was the 
Snider Enfield, originally a conversion of the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle musket and 
derivatives (such as the naval rifle, cavalry carbine, and artillery carbine, among others). 
The Mark III Snider Enfield featured new parts instead of converting parts from a 
musket, a locking mechanism on the breech block, and a new steel barrel. This particular 
specimen is a cavalry carbine, long neglected and bearing the marks of many years of 
hard service. The sling ring behind the brass trigger guard indicates the British sold the 
weapon to the Portuguese as surplus, and the butt of the carbine bear corresponding ‘Sold 
Out of Service’ marks above the Enfield stampings and First Class Arm markings. The 
protruding rod sticking out of the Snider action by the rear sight is the block pin, frozen 
by grime and unable to be removed. Author’s Collection.
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Figure 2: The Action of a British .577-caliber Snider-Enfield Mark III Carbine
The breech and action of the Mark III Snider Enfield carbine, in the loading position. 
Visible on the breech block is the catch (center) and locking lever (extreme right), which 
secure into a recess at the weapon’s tang to prevent a faulty cartridge blowing the breech 
open. The British added such an implement only on the Mark III variant. Also visible is 
the firing pin and protector (below the block), which made use of the old musket nipple 
to house a firing pin, or striker in British parlance, and the spring. The rear sight is the 
carbine variety, graduated to six hundred yards. The Snider was a decent weapon, but 
decidedly inferior to the Springfield. To extract a cartridge and load a new one, the 
British weapon a soldier had to half cock the rifle, open the block, pull the block back to 
extract the cartridge, then tip the rifle over or pull the spent case out before inserting 
another one. All an American trooper had to do was half cock his weapon, actuate the 
lever to open the block, which once opened extracted and ejected the round. The failings 
of the Springfield at Little Big Horn were due to ammunition, not the rifle. The faults of 
the Snider involved both the ammunition and the design of the action. Author’s 
Collection. 
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Figure 3: The British .450/577-caliber Martini-Henry Mark II Rifle
 
Perhaps the most well known British service rifle, the Martini-Henry was an excellent 
design whose ammunition, like that of the Trapdoor Springfield, plagued it in battle. This 
example is an 1880s-dated Mark II model that in the late 1890s was sent to India and then 
Nepal, where it was stored until discovered in 2003 by American arms importers at the 
Lagan Silekhana Palace in Katamandu, Nepal. The rifle has a modern appearance, but 
like the Springfield, it could not be converted to a repeating rifle. The lever is a loading 
lever, pulling it down cocks the rifle and opens the breech; raising it up seals the breech 
and allows the rifle to be fired. With early foil brass cartridges sand could jam the rifle, 
such as at Abu Klea in 1885, but new drawn brass cartridges and a longer loading lever 
alleviated these problems. This particular Mark II is marked as a Second Class or 
obsolete arm and is stamped N.S. N.E.P. for Native State, Nepal. (“Nepalese Cache 
Extras,” International Military Antiques, <http://www.ima-
usa.com/index.php/cPath/29_175> (Accessed April 29, 2010)). Author’s Collection. 
Figure 4: The Action of a British .450/577-caliber Martini-Henry Mark II Rifle
 
Close up of the action on the Martini-Henry Mark II, showing the open breech when the 
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loading lever is lowered. The Martini-Henry had a high rate of fire and was an accurate 
weapon, but shooting tests at Sandy Hook, New Jersey reinforced American officers’ 
beliefs that the Springfield was superior in accuracy and range. This particular example 
went through so many refurbishments that the only markings left visible on the action 
body are the “II” for Mark II and “2” for Second Class Arm: the Royal Cypher, maker, 
and year of manufacture have long since been erased. Author’s Collection. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The United States .45-caliber Model 1873 Springfield Rifle and Bayonet 
 
The .45-caliber Model 1873 Springfield, this particular example made in 1886, with 
Model 1873 bayonet and scabbard. Note the musket-like appearance, and the “trapdoor” 
action in front of the hammer. The bayonet, like that of a Civil War musket, uses the front 
sight as a bayonet lug, and locks into place by means of a swiveling ring. The weapon 
bears a close resemblance to the Snider-Enfield, as both designs initially were 
conversions of muskets and muzzle-loading weapons. While the Springfield in its 
ultimate issue form fired a reduced caliber round, yielding better ballistic qualities, the 
British Snider always used a musket caliber cartridge, part of why the latter weapon did 
not enjoy as long a service life as the Springfield. Springfield Armory fabricated this 
particular rifle at the end of the production run of the Model 1873, the same year the 
weapon was made the Model 1884 supplanted the weapon on the production lines (Poyer 
and Reisch, The .45-70 Springfield 4th Ed., 234). Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 6: The Action of a United States .45-caliber Model 1873 Springfield Rifle 
 
Close up of the lock and action of the .45-caliber Model 1873 Springfield. The 
breechblock functions like a bolt, as it contains the firing pin, locks into the receiver, and 
activates the extractor, and gives the rifle the name most collectors and historians know it 
by: The “Trapdoor” Springfield. The ejector is on the left side of the rifle’s receiver. The 
rear sight also demonstrates the continued improvements this rifle received. While the 
army standardized the rifle in 1873, the rear sight is an improved 1879 pattern, and 
Springfields of a new model made after this specimen featured another type of improved 
sight. This rifle has no visible safety, but instead the lock has a three-click tumbler with 
the first cock acting as a safety, a feature added to the Springfield in the late 1880s. At the 
first cocked position, the rifle cannot be fired, and there is insufficient clearance for the 
breechblock to be opened. At half cock, as on the earlier Springfields, the rifle can be 
loaded but not fired. At full cock, the rifle can be reloaded and fired.  At the rear of the 
breech block (the top in the picture) is the locking mechanism that secured the block into 
the rifle’s tang before firing, a feature only added to the Snider-Enfield in its third 
incarnation. Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 7: The Dutch 11mm Klein Kaliber Geweer Model 1871/88 Beaumont-VitaliF
Close up of the action of the Dutch Klein Kaliber Geweer Model 1871/88, caliber 11mm. 
This particular specimen, serial number was made in 1876 and converted to the Vitali 
box-magazine system in 1890. This rifle design predates the American .45-caliber 
Springfield by two years, and borrowed much from the French Modèle 1866 Chassepot. 
This design is comparable with the other early bolt-action designs the United States 
Army compared with the Springfield. The rifle, unlike the Springfield, has no safety: the 
large button on the left side of the receiver is a magazine cutoff, added in 1890 when this 
rifle received a magazine. Even in Europe, army officers saw the magazine only as an 
emergency measure. Pushing the lever forwards allows the bolt to pick up cartridges from 
the magazine follower, pushing it rearward cuts off the magazine, turning the weapon 
into a single-loader. Author’s Collection. 
 
134 
 
Figure 8: The Bolts From Dutch Model 1871/88 and German Model 1888 Rifles
A comparison of the bolts of a Dutch 11mm Klein Kaliber Geweer Model 1871/88 
Beaumont-Vitali, made in 1876 (bottom) and a later bolt from a German 8mm Infanterie 
Gewehr Model 1888 Commission rifle, made in 1891 (top). Although bolt-action designs 
existed in the 1870s, they were not superior to the Springfield, and none of the actions of 
those designs continued beyond the service life of the Springfield rifle. Note the frail 
construction on the Beaumont’s bolt, its wobbly extractor and bolt head, and the lack of a 
safety (the safety on the German bolt is at the rear, in the “fire” setting). The Dutch bolt 
also has no locking lugs, relying on the bolt handle, which locks in front of the rear 
bridge of the receiver, to keep the bolt from flying out of the weapon should there be a 
catastrophic malfunction. The Gewehr 1888 has dual locking lugs in the front of the bolt, 
which also features a detachable bolt head, of stronger construction that the Dutch rifle. 
Although the German bolt is of the correct type, it is a actually a post-World War One 
replacement made for Turkey as Germany sent this particular rifle to the Ottomans during 
the Great War. Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 9: The Italian 6.5mm Fucile Modello 1870/87/15 Vetterli-Vitali 
The action of an Italian Fucile Modello 1870/87/15 Vetterli-Vitali, produced at Torino in 
1889. This rifle represents one of the more conservative designs in Europe. The Italians 
liked the Swiss Vetterli rifle, but did not approve of the magazine or the rim-fire 
cartridge. Chambered in a centerfire 10.35mm cartridge and without a magazine, the 
Italian army used these weapons for seventeen years before deciding that a magazine was 
necessary, at which point they added the four-round Vitali box magazine in 1887. This 
particular weapon, which was originally made with a Vitali magazine, underwent 
conversion during World War One to accept the smokeless 6.5mm Carcano round, then 
standard issue for the Italian army’s 6.5mm Fucile Modello 1891 Carcano, along with a 
new magazine. Due to the higher pressures of smokeless rounds, the resulting rifle, unlike 
the original, was as hazardous to friendly soldiers as it was to the enemy. Note the rear 
locking lugs of the bolt, and the crude safety below the bolt by the stock that must be set 
before the bolt is closed. The knob at the top of the rifle is the magazine cutoff, rendered 
non-functional by the Great War-era Carcano magazine. Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 10: The Tubular Insert of the 6.5mm Fucile Mo. 1870/87/15 Vetterli-Vitali
Close up of the magazine cutoff of the 
Modello 1870/87/15 Vetterli-Vitali rifle, rendered non functional with the new Carcano 
magazine system, and showing the large, tubular insert in the barrel, designed to sleeve 
the rifle from 10.35mm down to 6.5mm-caliber. Just above the chamber, to the left of the 
lug recess, is a large crack in the receiver, testimony to the inability of late nineteenth-
century designs to withstand improvement and updating in the era of the smokeless 
cartridge. Author’s Collection. 
Figure 11: Four-Round Vitali 
Box Magazine                
The four-round Vitali Box 
Magazine, seen on a Dutch 
Beaumont Rifle, as used by the 
Dutch and the Italians on their 
Beaumont and Vetterli Rifles. 
This modification allowed these 
nations to delay, slightly, the 
adoption of smokeless, repeating 
rifles. On both rifles so fitted, 
the arsenals added magazine cut-
offs to allow the weapons to 
continue to function as single 
loaders. Armies by the 
beginning of the 1890s demanded magazine rifles but tactical doctrine had yet to 
determine how to employ them. Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 12: Side by Side: Beaumont-Vitali, Springfield, Vetterli-Vitali
Displayed in order of manufacture, the Dutch 11mm Klein Kaliber Geweer 1871/88 
Beaumont-Vitali (1876), the United States Rifle, Caliber .45, Model 1873 Springfield 
(1886), and the Italian 6.5mm Fucile Modello 1870/87/15 Vetterli-Vitali (1889). The 
Beaumont and the Vetterli both appear to be more modern designs than the Springfield, 
which displays musket origins, but all met the same fate. The Dutch and Italian designs 
were repeating conversions but lack of doctrine allowing the use of them in that role 
meant that they were no more effective than a Springfield, with a similar rate of fire. For 
the seventeen years between their adoption and the conversion to repeaters, they also had 
no advantage on the Springfield.  Between the Franco-Prussian War and the adoption of 
the Modèle 1886 Lebel smokeless rifle, no rifle possessed any real advantage over 
another – indicating that the United States Army’s reliance on the Springfield did not 
transcend into conservatism until other nations began to adopt magazine rifles. Then, in 
the smokeless era, the inability to evolve past the single loading doctrine and abandon the 
rifle in use since 1866 made the army conservative. Author’s Collection. 
Figure 13: The United States .30-caliber Model 1898 Krag-Jorgensen
United States Magazine Rifle, caliber .30, Model of 1898, the “Krag-Jorgensen.” This 
rifle was an improvement over the Model 1892 and 1896 Krag-Jorgensens, designed to 
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correct deficiencies in sighting and other problems. This weapon is fitted with a Model 
1901 sight, although this particular rifle, according to Joe Poyer, was one of the first ones 
off the assembly line at Springfield Armory in May 1900 (Poyer and Reisch, The 
American Krag Rifle and Carbine, 235). The shiny chrome finish is not original to the 
rifle, as this firearm is a restored piece that was a Veterans of Foreign Wars parade 
weapon, and should have a blued finish like the Springfield in Figures Five and Six. Note 
this particular rifle is missing its safety, which would otherwise be at the rear of the bolt. 
Author’s Collection. 
Figure 14: The Action of a United States .30-caliber Model 1898 Krag-Jorgensen
The action of a .30-caliber Model 1898 Krag-Jorgensen. Note the magazine gate, which 
was excellent for single loading but was incapable of quick charger loading. The spring 
that feeds cartridges into the receiver housed in the gate when the gate is open. Note the 
lack of any charger guides or any other method to facilitate rapid reloading. The barrel is 
an original replacement, added to bring a worn out relic back to shooting condition. 
Author’s Collection. 
Figure 15: The Action of an 
Argentinean 7.65mm Mauser 
Modelo Argentino 1891 Close up 
of the action on a German-made 
export Argentinean Mauser, 
caliber 7.65mm, made in Berlin in 
1899. This rifle and the 
proceeding Belgian 1889 and 
Turkish 1890, all three of similar 
design and caliber, were the first 
Mauser smokeless repeating rifles, 
but intended only for export. Note the charger guides at the rear of the receiver to 
facilitate quick stripper clip loading. Most foreign designs by 1899, not including the Lee 
Enfield, allowed some method of quick reloading, by either enbloc or stripper clips, 
features not present on the American Krag-Jorgensen. Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 16: The Infanterie Gewehr 1888, Fucile Mo. 1891, and Repetier Stutzen 1895 
These three 1890s weapons represent the main types of enbloc-clip firearms in European 
service during the 1890s. Top is a German Infanterie Gewehr 1888 “Commission Rifle” 
made by Ludwig Loewe in Berlin in 1891, later given to Turkey as war aid during the 
First World War, with an 1871-dated bayonet originally for the Infanterie Gewehr 1871 
Mauser. Second is an Austrian Repetier Stutzen 1895, a Mannlicher design, made in 1917 
at Vienna, with its undated bayonet. This carbine was not the first Mannlicher magazine 
system used by the Austrians, who employed older versions as early as the mid-1880s, 
and used the 1895 action in both carbines and long rifles. Bottom is another Mannlicher-
style rifle, an Italian Fucile Modello 1891, the Carcano, made in Rome in 1918 with a 
bayonet from 1942. This rifle replaced the Vetterli-Vitali in Italian service. All three 
firearms use smokeless ammunition, the German weapon the 8mm Mauser round, the 
Austrian a rimmed 8mm round, and the Italian a smaller 6.5mm round (pictured is 
7.35mm ammunition from World War Two, used in Model 1938-style Carcano rifles, 
although the clips are interchangeable with 1890s era 6.5mm rifles). 
The packet clips are inserted into the magazine (two each are pictured below the Model 
1895 and Model 1891), and when the last cartridge is chambered the clip drops out of the 
weapon. In 1905, the Germans updated some of their Gewehr 88s, including this one, 
modifying them to accept the pointed-bullet ammunition and stripper clips used by the 
newly adopted Infanterie Gewehr 1898 Mauser. Instead of continuing to use Mannlicher-
style packet clips, the weapon now utilized ammunition on stripper clips (pictured below 
the rifle). The stripper clips were lighter than the packet clips, allowing soldiers to carry 
more ammunition in battle. Author’s Collection.
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